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“No, I have never seen an example of tacit collusion.  I think it is 
one of those things that flows out of conventional oligopoly
theory, which is now in the process of disintegrating before our 
eyes.” 
   —Robert Bork1 
I. INTRODUCTION
Conscious parallelism, sometimes called tacit collusion, occurs when
firms adopt their business practices based on what other firms are doing,
rather than competing for consumers.2  The phenomenon typically
afflicts oligopolistic industries3 in which the presence of few sellers 
facilitates such coordination.4  The most obvious manifestation occurs 
when prices across companies in an industry not only become suspiciously 
similar but also change rapidly in strikingly parallel ways.  Suggested
examples are legion and varied: airline tickets,5 gasoline,6 cellular phone
1. Panel Discussion: Has the Reliance in Antitrust Policymaking by Congress 
and Enforcement Authorities on an Alleged Relationship Between Industry Concentration and 
Certain Anticompetitive Effects Been Misguided?, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 896, 904 (1977) 
(statement of Robert Bork).
2. See, e.g., MARC IVALDI ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF UNILATERAL EFFECTS:
INTERIM REPORT FOR DG COMPETITION, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 5 (2003), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_of_unilateral_ef
fects_en.pdf (“Consequently the anticipation of a response to one’s own action is at the 
heart of tacit collusion, and passive adaptation to market conditions is incompatible with
tacit collusion under any circumstances.”); Timothy J. Langella, Bichler v. Eli Lilly: An
Improper Use of Conscious Parallelism as Evidence of Concerted Action, 62 B.U. L.
REV. 633, 645 (1982) (“‘Conscious parallelism’ refers to the common practice of conducting
similar businesses in a uniform manner, with each business aware that the others are
pursuing the same course of action.”); Robert E. Nielsen, Note, The “No-Conduct” 
Approach to Monopoly Power and Its Application to Oligopoly, 15 VAL. U. L. REV. 529, 
530 n.10 (1981) (“Conscious parallelism is where several rival firms act in a similar 
manner each with the knowledge of what the others are doing.”).  For a more detailed 
definition, see infra Part II.A.1.
3. See, e.g., Joseph F. Zellmer, Note, Detecting Collusion in Oligopolistic 
Industries: A Comparison and Proposal, 6 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 829, 829 
(1983) (“The term ‘oligopoly’ refers to a type of industry structure where a small number
of firms control a large percentage of a market.  This type of industry structure is 
prominent in American business.” (footnotes omitted)).
4. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Firm Decision-Making Process and Oligopoly 
Theory, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 270, 271 (1975); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly 
Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 9, 9–10 (2004). 
5. See, e.g., Robert E. Cooper, Communication and Cooperation Among 
Competitors: The Case of the Airline Industry, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 549, 550 (1993); Eli 
A. Friedman, Comment, Airline Antitrust: Getting Past the Oligopoly Problem, 9 U.
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 121, 121–22 (2001). 
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text messaging7 and roaming8 rates, interest rates on bank accounts,9 
credit card interchange fees,10 movie tickets,11 recorded music,12 breakfast
cereals,13 real estate14 and travel agent15 commissions, electricity prices in
deregulated markets,16 and air cargo fuel surcharges,17 just to name a few.18 
Although this phenomenon might seem obviously and intuitively 
antithetical to antitrust principles, its punishment has long been
problematic to cartel theory.  The root of competition law’s current 
weakness lies in the belief that absent an ability to prove explicit
collusion among players, conscious parallelism cannot be punished.19 
Unfortunately, though, supracompetitive pricing engenders the same 
6. See, e.g., Kenneth Bredemeier, Oil Firms Said To Prop Up Gas Prices, WASH.
POST, Apr. 30, 2002, at E1. 
7. See, e.g., Scott Woolley, Nothing to LOL About, FORBES, Oct. 27, 2008, at 32, 32. 
8. See, e.g., W.H. Melody, Assessing Highly Imperfect Mobile Markets, 25 
TELECOMM. POL’Y 1, 1 (2001). 
9. See, e.g., Michael A. Robinson, Investigation of California Banks Rates 
Requested, AM. BANKER, Nov. 1, 1988, at 3, available at 1988 WLNR 726009. 
10. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Costs of Credit Cards 79–80
(Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.: Bus., Econ. & Regulatory Policy Working Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 973974, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=973974. 
11. See, e.g., Barak Y. Orbach, Antitrust and Pricing in the Motion Picture
Industry, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 317, 317 (2004). 
12. See, e.g., Tim Burt & Gautam Malkani, Brussels Warns of Music Industry
Collusion, FIN. TIMES (London), May 25, 2004, available at Factiva.com, Doc. No. 
FTCOM00020040526e05p0001d. 
13. See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-To-Eat 
Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9 BELL J. ECON. 305, 306, 315 (1978). 
14. See, e.g., William L. Trombetta, Using Antitrust Law To Control Anticompetitive 
Real Estate Industry Practices, 14 J. CONSUMER AFF. 142, 147–48 (1980). 
15. See, e.g., Skye M. McQueen, Comment, The Summary Judgment Standard in
Antitrust Conspiracy Cases and In re Travel Agency Commission Antitrust Litigation,
62 J. AIR L. & COM. 1155, 1160 (1997). 
16. See, e.g., Robert B. Martin, III, Note, Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming of 
Antitrust Enforcement in the California Electricity Crisis, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 278 
(2003). 
17. See, e.g., Dustin Appel, Comment, Air Cargo Fuel Surcharges and Tacit 
Collusion Under the Sherman Act: What Good Is Catching a Few Bad Guys if Consumers 
Still Get Robbed?, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 375, 376 (2008). 
18. Though this Article focuses on the United States, the problem obviously exists 
in other countries as well.  See, e.g., Jon Ungoed-Thomas & Steven Swinford, Big Six 
Energy Firms Keep Prices Inflated, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Jan. 13, 2008, at 4, 
available at 2008 WLNR 718283; Niklas Strand, Tacit Collusion in the EU Sugar 
Markets 2, 11–12 (2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at www.snee.org/filer/ 
papers/204.pdf. 
19. See, e.g., W. Bentley MacLeod, A Theory of Conscious Parallelism, 27 EUR.
ECON. REV. 25, 40 (1985). 
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economic harm whether “achieved by direct agreement or sophisticated 
conscious parallelism.”20  After all, 
To a consumer . . . there is no practical difference between a non-competitive
price set by an explicit pact among sellers and one arrived at by tacit collusion— the
end result on the pocketbook is the same. Yet, while courts would likely condemn a
blatant agreement to fix prices as a per se violation, consciously parallel action—
even though it yields an identical economic effect—would escape prosecution. 
This gap in the protections afforded by the antitrust laws has been called by
some “the oligopoly problem.”21 
Given its vast cost to the public,22 “it is widely understood to be an
objective of antitrust policy to forestall oligopolistic pricing.  The 
question is how.”23  As one commentator laments, “[T]he single most
important industrial phenomenon facing competition policy—closely
coordinated oligopoly without collusion—is beyond the reach of legal
tools originally fashioned, not to deal with the economic behaviour and
effects of oligopoly, but to deal with agreements among individuals to 
commit acts clearly defined to be illegal.”24  As a consequence, “[f]or 
more than 100 years, the courts and antitrust enforcement agencies have
struggled unsuccessfully to regulate the anticompetitive conduct of 
oligopolists.”25 
This Article argues that this struggle can be overcome through a more 
robust, less anemic conception of antitrust that is willing to confront 
 20. W.T. Stanbury & G.B. Reschenthaler, Oligopoly and Conscious Parallelism: 
Theory, Policy and the Canadian Cases, 15 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 617, 688 (1977); see 
also Elmer J. Schaefer, Basing-Point Pricing Establishes Illegal Vertical Agreements, 18 
GA. L. REV. 529, 535 (1984) (“If successful, conscious parallelism based on implicit
price signaling creates the same harm as an explicit agreement to fix prices.”).
 21. Appel, supra note 17, at 384 (footnotes omitted); see also WALTER ADAMS &
JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 188 (2d ed. 2004). 
22. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, Trouble for Private Enforcement of the Sherman Act:
Twombly, Pleading Standards, and the Oligopoly Problem, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1057, 
1102 (“Oligopoly pricing costs consumers billions of dollars and results in significant 
misallocation of resources.”). 
23. Stephen A. Nye, Can Conduct Oriented Enforcement Inhibit Conscious 
Parallelism?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 206, 206 (1975). 
24. Stanbury & Reschenthaler, supra note 20, at 695. 
 25. Piraino, supra note 4, at 9; see also Barry J. Rodger, The Oligopoly Problem
and the Concept of Collective Dominance: EC Developments in the Light of U.S. Trends 
in Antitrust Law and Policy, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 25, 36 (1996) (“Most U.S. commentators 
agree that the American law is inadequate to deal with oligopolistic market problems.”); 
Alan Devlin, Note, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Parallel Pricing in
Oligopolistic Markets, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (2007) (“While antitrust law has 
been markedly successful in eliminating express cartels, competition policy has been
equally noteworthy for its failure to effectively address instances of parallel pricing that 
may have an economically analogous effect to explicit price-fixing.” (footnote omitted)). 
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conscious parallelism.  It is structured into three parts.  After delving
into some detail about what conscious parallelism is, Part II argues, 
contrary to the conventional wisdom, that current antitrust law is flexible 
enough to address such behavior—be it through the Sherman, Clayton, 
or Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Acts.  Part III discusses what light
microeconomics might shed on the problem.  In particular, it focuses on 
the central and thorny question of how to distinguish between whether 
the parallelism is due to competition or tacit coordination.26  It argues 
that although current incarnations of game theory leave much to be
desired, a renewed focus on the Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) 
paradigm of industrial organization, combined with careful econometric 
studies, can help reveal where conscious parallelism lies and where it
does not.  Several examples are offered to buttress the argument.  Finally, 
Part IV argues—again, contrary to mainstream antitrust thinking—that a 
range of effective remedies does indeed exist to address conscious
parallelism. In sum, this Article’s goal is “to start closing the gap in 
antitrust law where oligopolists now reside.”27 
II. LEGAL POSSIBILITIES
Part II begins with a detailed definition of conscious parallelism and 
the anemic response the problem has received under current doctrine.
More importantly, it then argues that there are several options within 
existing antitrust jurisprudence with which to combat conscious parallelism.
A.  Definitions and Current Doctrine 
1.  Defining “Conscious Parallelism” 
Conscious parallelism occurs when competitors “restrain trade by 
intentionally imitating their competitors’ actions with reasonably high 
expectations of a responsive imitation that will lessen the rigors of
26. Cf. Julian M. Joshua & Sarah Jordan, Combinations, Concerted Practices and
Cartels: Adopting the Concept of Conspiracy in European Community Competition Law, 
24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 647, 662 (2004) (“The crucial issue is whether the players in
an oligopolistic market garner their uncompetitive prices and supra-competitive profits 
as a result of ineluctable market forces or whether they have acted in a deliberate manner.”). 
 27. Zellmer, supra note 3, at 854. 
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competition.”28  The phenomenon is sometimes called “tacit collusion,”
given that “communication is indirect, as firms infer rivals’ intentions 
from their actions or from market outcomes.”29  Though the terms are
often used interchangeably,30 this Article will use conscious parallelism to 
avoid any confusion that might ensue from the word collusion, which 
tends to suggest some form of necessarily illegal communication.31  Perhaps
unsurprisingly, some commentators prefer it the other way.32 
Conscious parallelism afflicts oligopolistic industries.33  As  Keith  
Hylton observes: 
Conscious parallelism is parallel behavior that typically appears in markets with 
small numbers of sellers.  It is not the result of an explicit agreement.  It occurs 
because in markets with few sellers, firms take the reactions of competitors into
account when deciding how much to produce or what price to set.  Although it 
is hard to find a precise definition of it, the term conscious parallelism refers to
a form of tacit collusion in which each firm in an oligopoly realizes that it is
28. Conscious Parallelism—Fact or Fancy?, 3 STAN. L. REV. 679, 680 (1951); see 
also Michael Ray Pfeifer, Note, Uniform Pricing in Concentrated Markets: Is Conscious 
Parallelism Prohibited by Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome?, 7 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
113, 114 (1974) (describing conscious parallelism as a situation in which the “market 
behavior” of one firm “tends to conform to that of its competitor” because the firm starts
responding to the actions, or at least the anticipated actions, of its competitor). 
29. Robert H. Porter, Detecting Collusion, 26 REV. INDUS. ORG. 147, 147–48 (2005).
30. See, e.g., Appel, supra note 17, at 383. 
31. As a group of economists pointed out: 
    We should stress at once that “tacit collusion” need not involve any “collusion” 
in the legal sense, and in particular need involve no communication between 
the parties.  It is referred to as tacit collusion only because the outcome (in terms of
prices set or quantities produced, for example) may well resemble that of explicit 
collusion or even of an official cartel.  A better term from a legal perspective 
might be “tacit coordination.” 
IVALDI ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 n.1. 
32. For instance, Richard Posner notes that: 
[I]n some circumstances competing sellers might be able to coordinate their
pricing without conspiring in the usual sense of the term—that is, without any
overt or detectable acts of communication. This is the phenomenon that 
lawyers call “conscious parallelism” and some economists term “oligopolistic 
interdependence,” but which I prefer to call “tacit collusion” in contrast to the
explicit collusion of the formal cartel of its underground counterpart. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 52–53 (2d ed. 2001). 
33. “An oligopoly is populated by a relatively few large firms which account for 
the majority of the industry’s sales.”  Nielsen, supra note 2, at 538.  Edward Chamberlin
popularized the term in economics.  See Edward H. Chamberlin, On the Origin of
“Oligopoly,” 67 ECON. J. 211, 211–12 (1957); see also Jacob Weissman, Is Oligopoly 
Illegal? A Jurisprudential Approach, 74 Q.J. ECON. 437, 457 (1960) (“Professor
Chamberlin introduced the term oligopoly to describe situations in which a few sellers 
share a market, a condition distinguished, on the one hand, from monopoly (a single 
seller whose control over supply necessarily involves control over price), and on the 
other hand, from pure competition (a large enough number of sellers so that the influence 
on supply, thus price, of any one or of several in combination is negligible).”). 
594
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within the interests of the entire group of firms to maintain a high price or to avoid
vigorous price competition, and the firms act in accordance with this realization.34 
The very fact that there are few sellers in the market makes it obviously
easier to monitor what other oligopolists are doing and react accordingly— 
as one commentator notes, “the most essential differentiating aspect” of
oligopoly is “the oligopolists’ consciousness of their interdependence.”35 
It is thus no coincidence that “[o]ligopolistic markets are characterized 
frequently by higher prices and lower outputs than competitive markets.”36 
After all, sellers are trying to “maximize joint profits (or, minimize joint
losses)”37 rather than vigorously compete for customers.38  Franklin 
Fisher even defines tacit collusion as “the tendency towards the cooperative,
joint-maximization solution.”39  As one commentator observes: 
One of the main market imperfections and surprisingly one of the most under-
regulated is oligopoly pricing. Oligopoly means few sellers.  The hallmark of 
oligopoly is the presence of strategic interactions among rival firms.  Though each 
firm may independently decide its strategic decisions, its rational decisions must 
take into account the anticipated reaction of its rival firms to its conduct.  The
recognition of oligopolistic interdependence might lead to coordinated conduct, 
which enables firms to charge a supra-competitive price.  Coordinated conduct may 
create significant welfare losses to society, depending on the existing market
 34. KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW
EVOLUTION 73 (2003); see also D.J. Simonetti, Note, Conscious Parallelism and the 
Sherman Act: An Analysis and Proposal, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (1977) (“The
term ‘conscious parallelism’ refers to the common practice among firms in a concentrated 
industry of conducting their similar businesses in a uniform manner, aware that their 
counterparts are pursuing the same course of action.”). 
 35. K.W. Rothschild, Price Theory and Oligopoly, 57 ECON. J. 299, 303 (1947);
see also R.F. Kahn, The Problem of Duopoly, 47 ECON. J. 1, 1 (1937); Nielsen, supra
note 2, at 538. 
36. Annmarie Levins, Comment, A Structural Approach to the Application of
Section One of the Sherman Act to Oligopolistic Interdependence, 35 ME. L. REV. 181, 
181 (1983). 
37. Arthur G. Fraas & Douglas F. Greer, Market Structure and Price Collusion:
An Empirical Analysis, 26 J. INDUS. ECON. 21, 29 (1977). 
38. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested 
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1564 (1969) (“Oligopolists are thus ‘interdependent’
in their pricing.  They base their pricing decisions in part on anticipated reactions to 
them.  The result is a tendency to avoid vigorous price competition.”).
39. Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 
RAND J. ECON. 113, 120 (1989). 
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conditions.  Oligopoly conditions exist in many industries even in a large market 
such as the U.S.40  
The problem of conscious parallelism has even been dubbed the 
“oligopoly problem.”41  Most importantly for the purpose of this Article,
though, its hallmark is the absence of agreement: “Conscious parallelism 
describes forms of tacitly collusive conduct in oligopoly.  Firms engage
in parallel behaviour in order to gain collusive profits.  A cartel is not set 
up explicitly; instead, firms establish parallel conduct understanding the 
accomplishment of a common purpose.”42 
2.  Conceived Awkwardness 
The fact that there is no explicit agreement seemingly creates an
enormous problem for antitrust law, which tends to focus on explicit 
collusion.43 The root of the difficulty is that, under conventional
interpretations, conscious parallelism does not meet the “contract,”
“combination,” or “conspiracy” requirement of section 1 of the Sherman
40. Michal S. Gal, Reducing Rivals Prices: Government-Supported Mavericks as 
New Solutions for Oligopoly Pricing 3 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law & Bus., Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 99-016, 2000) (footnotes omitted), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=211728. 
41. See, e.g., Appel, supra note 17, at 376. 
 42. Hans-Theo Normann, Conscious Parallelism in Asymmetric Oligopoly, 51
METROECONOMICA 343, 343 (2000); see also John Purinton Dunn, Conscious Parallelism 
Reexamined, 35 B.U. L. REV. 225, 228 (1955) (“[C]onscious parallelism means action by
one competing enterprise, A, similar in detail to that of another business, B, or other 
businesses, B and C, each one, A, B and C, relying on the fact that such action is similar 
and that it will be in the interest of each to continue that behavior, and yet each refraining 
from communicating directly with the other for the purpose of entering into a full-blown
agreement.”); Levins, supra note 36, at 196 (“According to traditional accounts of 
oligopolistic interdependence, price accommodation sometimes occurs without firms agreeing
to accommodate.”).
43. As one commentator observes: 
[O]ligopolistic undertakings can establish non-competitive positions in one of
two ways: (1) by engaging in true collusive behavior; or (2) by practicing so-
called intelligent or conscious parallelism, which translates into adapting their
conduct to that of their competitors.  The first case falls within the scope of the 
antitrust law, which expressly forbids collusive practices.  The second case, 
however, raises the problem of applying antitrust law to conscious parallelism.
It should be emphasized that the effect on the market is identical . . . . 
Enrico Adriano Raffaelli, Oligopolies and Antitrust Law, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 915, 
917–18 (1996) (footnote omitted); see also Thomas E. Cooper, Most-Favored-Customer 
Pricing and Tacit Collusion, 17 RAND J. ECON. 377, 377 (1986) (“Overt formal
coordination, such as actual agreements to fix prices, has been the primary object of
antitrust law.  A more subtle form of coordination that resembles the monopoly outcome
is tacit collusion, in which firms choose higher prices because of mutual recognition of
their interdependence.”).
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Act.44  This perspective is based on a selective reading of Donald 
Turner’s classic article, written in 1962, in which he concluded “that 
oligopolists who take into account the probable reactions of competitors 
in setting their basic prices, without more in the way of ‘agreement’ than 
is found in ‘conscious parallelism,’ should not be held unlawful 
conspirators under the Sherman Act.”45  Turner’s conclusion rests on his
belief that parallel behavior is inherent and rational in oligopolistic 
industries: 
In a significant sense, the behavior of the rational oligopolist in setting his price 
is precisely the same as that of the rational seller in an industry consisting of a 
very large number of competitors.  Both are pricing their product and determining
their output so as to make the highest profit, or suffer the least loss, that can be
obtained in the market conditions facing them.  The rational oligopolist simply
takes one more factor into account—the reactions of his competitors to any
price change that he makes.46 
Turner further opined “that conscious parallelism is never meaningful by
itself, but always assumes whatever significance it might have from 
additional facts.  Thus, conscious parallelism is not even evidence of
agreement unless there are some other facts indicating that the decisions 
of the alleged conspirators were interdependent.”47  In another famous 
article, Richard Posner criticized Turner’s position,48 but Turner’s
opinion has become embedded in the doctrine. 
Consistent with Turner’s position, courts have spent their time 
searching for additional evidence suggesting there is a conspiracy49—the
“plus factors” approach “to bridge the conceptual gap between conscious 
44. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of
Expertise in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 674 (2005); Emil John Kotalik, 
Jr., Note, Conscious Parallelism: The Business Judgment Defense in a Summary
Judgment Context, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 115, 116 (1983).  Section 1 states that “[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal.”  Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
45. Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 671 (1962). 
46. Id. at 665. 
47. Id. at 658. 
48. See Posner, supra note 38.  For the argument that the differences between 
Turner and Posner are not as great as one might expect, see John E. Lopatka, Solving the 
Oligopoly Problem: Turner’s Try, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 843, 845 (1996). 
49. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST
131–32 (Mass. Inst. Tech. Press 3d ed. 2000) (“The key question is whether the 
conspiracy can be inferred from such conscious parallelism.”).
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parallelism and conspiracy.”50  William Kovacic outlines “the traditional 
litany of plus factors”: 
[T]he existence of a rational motive to conspire, the presence of behavior that is
contrary to the defendant’s self-interest unless pursued as part of a common 
plan (put another way, a phenomena that cannot be explained rationally, except 
as the outcome of concerted action), communications among rivals or at least the
opportunity to communicate, industry conditions that facilitate or reinforce
collusion, performance data such as high profitability that suggest successful 
coordination over time, and the lack of a plausible business justification for the
behavior.51 
The first two factors that Kovacic outlines have by far been the most
important to courts.52  This is likely because the emphasis in plus factors
analysis has been toward trying to find circumstantial evidence of
agreement or conspiracy, and motive and self-interest purportedly can 
serve to screen for this.  It would not be an exaggeration to say that the 
plus factors approach takes the problem of conscious parallelism and
turns it into an evidentiary problem; namely, what circumstantial 
evidence can be used to adduce an agreement?53  As Kovacic notes, the
“crucial policy issue in such matters is how to define the quantum of 
proof that will support an inference that the defendants exchanged 
assurances.”54 
 50. Simonetti, supra note 34, at 1231; see also  VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 49, at 
134 (“The accumulated precedents have been summarized as ‘parallelism plus.’”); 
William E. Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements Under the 
Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 34 (1993) (“[C]ourts require plaintiffs who emphasize 
parallel conduct to introduce additional facts, often termed ‘plus factors,’ to justify an
inference of collective action.”); Devlin, supra note 25, at 1122–23 (“[P]lus factors are
required to demonstrate that overt agreements were entered into.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).
51. William E. Kovacic et al., The Detection and Punishment of Tacit Collusion, 9
LOYOLYA CONSUMER L. REP. 151, 155–56 (1997); see also Michael D. Blechman,
Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating Devices: The Problem of Tacit 
Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881, 886–87 (1979) (listing 
various plus factors). 
52. See, e.g., Blechman, supra note 51, at 885 (“The circumstance, or ‘plus factor,’ 
which has been most frequently considered in this connection is whether or not the 
defendants’ conduct accords with their individual self-interest.” (footnote omitted)); Randall
David Marks, Can Conspiracy Theory Solve the “Oligopoly Problem”?, 45 MD. L. REV. 
387, 405 (1986) (“[Courts] have established two general tests for deciding whether particular
behavior qualifies as a ‘plus factor’: whether it is contrary to each firm’s independent 
self-interest, and whether there is a motive for concerted action.”).
53. See, e.g., Arthur Austin, Adam Smith on the Inevitability of Price Fixing, 55 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501, 505 (2005); Turner, supra note 45, at 672; Kotalik, supra
note 44, at 124. 
54. William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy and Horizontal Collusion in the 21st
Century, 9 LOYOLA CONSUMER L. REP. 97, 99 (1997); see also ADAMS & BROCK, supra
note 21, at 118 (discussing the difficulties that accompany prosecuting cases in which 
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This evidentiary approach has become increasingly important to 
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.55  Consider that in its 
Interstate Circuit opinion in 1939, the Court held that “[i]t is elementary
that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without
simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators.”56  Yet
in its 1954 Theatre Enterprises opinion, the Court seemed to have a 
change of heart.57  In what is arguably the most oft-cited passage in the
jurisprudence of conscious parallelism, the Court proclaimed:
But this Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior conclusively
establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a
Sherman Act offense.  Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior 
may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy, 
but “conscious parallelism” has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act
entirely.58 
Seemingly ignoring the crucial fact that Theatre Enterprises appears in
the context of a directed verdict,59 unfortunately “[e]ver since, there has
been a pronounced tendency among lawyers, judges, legislators, legal 
scholars, and enforcement agencies to belittle Section 1 as a largely
ineffective constraint on consciously parallel oligopoly pricing.”60 
After Theatre Enterprises, there were also two major procedural 
setbacks for plaintiffs.  The Matsushita case in 1986 imposed the plus 
there is not an overt conspiracy); Langella, supra note 2, at 645–46 (discussing that fact 
that circumstantial evidence of an illegal agreement is the only type of evidence
available in most cases); cf. Joshua & Jordan, supra note 26, at 663 (“The so-called
‘attack’ on the oligopoly problem has been dogged by evidential problems . . . .”); Marks,
supra note 52, at 387 (“Oligopoly markets, in particular, present intractable problems of proof
in antitrust litigation.”).
55. Cf. Kovacic, supra note 50, at 15 (“Early litigation involving section 1 rarely
posed the question of whether the requisite agreement existed.”).
56. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939). 
57. See Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541
(1954). 
58. Id. (footnote omitted).
59. This is a reality that, to his credit, Turner himself acknowledges.  See Turner,
supra note 45, at 658 (“The holding of the case [Theatre Enterprises] was extremely 
narrow, namely that a refusal to grant a directed verdict was no error in the face of
conflicting evidence.  This is not a holding that a jury could not infer conspiracy on the 
basis of conscious parallelism alone.”). 
 60. Nye, supra note 23, at 207.  See also Blechman, supra note 51, at 884 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s argument that he was entitled 
to a directed verdict in Theatre Enterprises). 
 599









       



























    
factors requirements at the summary judgment phase.61  Most recently in 
2007, Twombly required the analysis at the motion to dismiss phase.62 
The Court first summarized prior law:
[W]e have previously hedged against false inferences from identical behavior at
a number of points in the trial sequence.  An antitrust conspiracy plaintiff with
evidence showing nothing beyond parallel conduct is not entitled to a directed
verdict . . . [Theatre Enterprises]; proof of a § 1 conspiracy must include evidence 
tending to exclude the possibility of independent action . . . ; and at the summary
judgment stage a § 1 plaintiff’s offer of conspiracy evidence must tend to rule 
out the possibility that the defendants were acting independently . . . [Matsushita].63 
The Court then went on to hold that henceforth a complaint in a section
1 case “requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true)
to suggest that an agreement was made”64—thereby imposing at the 
motion to dismiss phase “the requirement of plausibility and the need for
something more than merely parallel behavior.”65  Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
Twombly is controversial.  Justice Stevens’s strong dissent noted that “a 
heightened production burden at the summary judgment stage does not
translate into a heightened pleading burden at the complaint stage,”66 
lamented that the majority should “not rewrite the Nation’s civil 
procedure textbooks”67 and argued that the “transparent policy concern
that drives the decision is the interest in protecting antitrust defendants.”68 
Predictably, a cottage industry has recently emerged to critique the 
61. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588
(1986) (“Respondents . . . must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in 
light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not 
have harmed respondents.”); see also  HYLTON, supra note 34, at 141 (“The modern
decisions involve summary judgments granted to defendants.  The doctrine that has 
emerged requires parallelism ‘plus’ something else in order to survive a summary
judgment motion.”); Appel, supra note 17, at 380 (“The degree of evidence necessary to
sustain an inference of an implied agreement is a vital issue in most cases, particularly to 
survive motions for acquittal or summary judgment.”). 
62. See, e.g., William H. Page, Twombly and Communication: The Emerging Definition 
of Concerted Action Under the New Pleading Standards, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
439, 447 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1286872. 
63. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007). 
64. Id. at 556.  To try to clarify its statement, the Court added that “[a]sking for 
plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the 
pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.” Id.
65. Id. at 560. 
66. Id. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
67. Id. at 579. 
68. Id. at 596.  The majority does seem concerned with unworthy claims surviving
the motion phase, thus leading to unnecessary settlements. See, e.g., id. at 557–58 (majority
opinion). 
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opinion,69 with one commentator even proclaiming, “Twombly is a 
confusing opinion replete with inconsistent statements.”70 
Regardless of one’s perspective of the merits of its opinions, the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence can be summarized simply.  As a former
Chairman of the FTC observes: 
The Supreme Court has held that conscious parallelism simply reflects rational
behavior by independent firms that correctly perceive and act upon competitive
interdependencies without reaching any sort of agreement or mutual understanding 
with their rivals.  Thus . . . conscious parallelism is not reachable under Section
1 of the Sherman Act because such behavior does not entail any act of agreement.71 
As this Article argues below, our jurisprudence could be more
ambitious. 
B.  New Conceptions 
Given the state of the law, commentators can be forgiven for griping
that “[d]espite more than a century of litigation under the Sherman Act
and the ability to draw on almost two centuries of economic theory, the 
federal courts have been unable to develop an effective means of
regulating oligopolists’ tacit collusion”72 or that because “much of 
American industry conforms to the oligopoly model, present antitrust 
law thus may be incapable of dealing with a pervasive market
69. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: The Demise of Notice Pleading, the 
Triumph of Milton Handler, and the Uncertain Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 
28 REV. LITIG. 1, 17 (2008) (“[T]hree areas of impact merit close attention: (1) the 
demise of notice pleading; (2) the shift in the litigation playing field in favor of
defendants; and (3) the Supreme Court’s lack of confidence in the ability of the lower 
courts and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to manage federal litigation in a cost-
effective manner.”); Page, supra note 62, at 447 (“[Twombly] failed to articulate a 
definition of agreement or to explain why these sorts of allegations would satisfy the 
definition.”); Richard M. Steuer, Plausible Pleading: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 861, 862 (2008) (“There can be little doubt that the Supreme
Court purposefully recalibrated the pleading requirements under Rule 12(b)(6) in 
Twombly.”).
 70. Goldman, supra note 22, at 1058. 
71. Deborah Platt Majoras, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust 
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ensuring Sound Antitrust Analysis: Two Examples, Address 
at the National Economic Research Associates 23d Annual Antitrust & Trade Regulation
Seminar 2 n.1 (July 3, 2003), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/201167.htm
(citation omitted).
 72. Piraino, supra note 4, at 24. 
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problem.”73  The root of the problem is that conscious parallelism is
undertheorized—too wedded to a selective reading of Turner’s nearly
half-century old thesis.  This Article argues, however, that existing tools
to combat conscious parallelism already exist in our law, should we 
choose to deploy them. 
1.  Sherman Act 
To begin with, there are possibilities under both section 1 and section 
2 of the Sherman Act.  First, and most simply, the standard for 
establishing a section 1 conspiracy might be lowered such that showing
an explicit agreement need not be required.74  Such an approach could be
justified in contract theory by arguing that conscious parallelism in
effect springs from a “‘meeting of the minds,’ whereby competitors 
recognize that it is in their collective best interests to set price or quantity 
equal to the collusive level.”75  Alternatively, one might argue that there 
is a “conscious commitment to a common scheme”76 or “an agreement to 
agree.”77  Perhaps most famously, Richard Posner argued that “[i]n
forbearing to seek short-term gains at each other’s expense in order to 
reap monopoly benefits that only such mutual forbearance will allow, 
they are much like the parties to a ‘unilateral contract,’ which is treated
by the law as a contract rather than as individual behavior.”78 
More important than contract theory in this context is the fact that 
Turner’s purported justification for limiting section 1—the rationality of
oligopolists’ behavior—has precious little to do with what antitrust 
should be concerned: the effect of such behavior.  As one commentator 
suggests, “Turner’s principal reason for opposing the application of 
section 1 to conscious parallelism—because the participants are merely 
acting in an economically rational manner—is unpersuasive in light of 
the harmful economic consequences of such activity, regardless of the 
73. Michael K. Vaska, Comment, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining
the Boundary, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 508, 512 (1985). 
74. See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 34, at 77. 
 75. Devlin, supra note 25, at 1112–13. 
 76. Kovacic, supra note 50, at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77. Joseph F. Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts—
From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285, 290 (1967) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 78. Posner, supra note 38, at 1576; see also Mark T.L. Sargent, Comment, 
Economics Upside-Down: Low-Price Guarantees as Mechanisms for Facilitating Tacit 
Collusion, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2101 (1993) (“Posner suggests extending the legal 
definition of ‘agreement’ to include any type of interdependent decisionmaking in 
oligopolistic markets.”). 
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rationality or irrationality of the participants’ conduct.”79  Put simply, we 
must not forget that antitrust law’s purpose is to protect consumers80 and 
that the “obsession with the conspiracy issue has diverted the courts’ 
attention from the effect of oligopolies on consumers.”81  Deemphasizing 
the conspiracy requirement has the added the benefit of bolstering 
antitrust enforcement in a world in which defendants have learned not to 
leave evidence of agreement behind.82 
Conscious parallelism might also be addressed via the antimonopolization 
provision of section 2 of the Sherman Act.83  At its core, the argument is
that oliopolists’ behavior can be analogized to that of monopolists: 
Parallel behavior of several “competing” firms, especially when such behavior
influences the price structure in the market, often has the same harmful effects
on the market as the exercise of monopoly power by a single enterprise . . . .  
Thus business practices that are forbidden to monopolists because of their size
can and should be forbidden to oligopolists whose collective market power, wielded
through conscious parallelism, approaches that of a single firm monopolist.84 
Though such an approach might seem unconventional at first glance, 
there is significant support for it in the literature.  It is congruent with the
 79. Simonetti, supra note 34, at 1234. 
80. See generally Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745 (2004). 
 81. Piraino, supra note 4, at 24; see also Bob F. Turner, Comment, Conscious
Parallelism in the Pricing of Gasoline, 32 ROCKY MOUNTAIN L. REV. 206, 215 (1960)
(discussing the underlying policy of the Sherman Act). 
82. See, e.g., Vernon A. Mund, Identical Bid Prices, 68 J. POL. ECON. 150, 169
(1960); cf. Kovacic, supra note 50, at 17 (“[S]ection 1 drove many cartels underground 
by forcing participants to take precautions to avoid detection and curtail the generation 
of evidence of direct communications that might be used to establish the common course 
of action.”).
83. Section 2 states that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony.”  15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  The statute is applied to both civil 
and criminal cases.  See Patricia B. Hsue, Comment, Lessons From United States v. Stein: Is
the Line Between Criminal and Civil Sanctions for Illegal Tax Shelters a Dot?, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. 903, 932 & n.200 (2008). 
 84. Simonetti, supra note 34, at 1240 (footnotes omitted).  See also Michael
Conant, Consciously Parallel Action in Restraint of Trade, 38 MINN. L. REV. 797, 797 
(1954) (“The economic theory of oligopoly explains how, in a market of only a few
firms, these firms may adopt price-output policies like or similar to those which would
result if they combined to restrain trade (a monopoly) and how they are able to
accomplish this without an actual or tacit agreement.”); Dunn, supra note 42, at 251 
(“[S]ince the manifestations of the parallel practices are the same as they would be in the
single-firm monopoly situation, then these ‘oligopolizers’ should . . . be grouped together
for purposes of a § 2 violation.”). 
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notion of “shared monopoly” put forth years ago in antitrust jurisprudence85 
and can be straightforwardly analogized to the idea of “collective dominant 
position” in European competition law.86  Even the Supreme Court has 
analogized conscious parallelism to shared monopoly:
Tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious
parallelism, describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a
concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices
at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared
economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output 
decisions.87 
Perhaps most surprisingly, in his seminal article, Turner himself argues 
that “[i]t would be possible, and possibly preferable, to attack the
particular kinds of conduct . . . by charging oligopolists individually with 
an unlawful ‘attempt to monopolize,’ or an unlawful ‘monopolization,’ 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.”88  Unfortunately, this portion of
Turner’s thesis has been ignored in the ensuing decades.89 
Thus, although it is tempting to argue that the Sherman Act is outdated
in its apparently dichotomous conceptions of competition and monopoly,90 
deeper inquiry reveals rich possibilities under both of its principal 
sections.  More holistically, one might simply argue that in drafting the 
Sherman Act, Congress’s “basic objective was to preserve competitive 
pricing.”91  After all, as the Supreme Court observed, 
85. See, e.g., ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 21, at 122; Peter C. Carstensen, 
Antitrust Law and the Paradigm of Industrial Organization, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 
519 (1983); cf. Blechman, supra note 51, at 891 & n.52 (discussing the government’s 
intention to target “shared monopolies” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
86. For a discussion of abuse of collective dominant position in European
jurisprudence, see, for example, Patrick S. Ryan, European Competition Law, Joint
Dominance, and the Wireless Oligopoly Problem, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 355, 358–59,
363–64 (2005); Andrew Scott, “An Immovable Feast”?: Tacit Collusion and Collective 
Dominance in Merger Control After Airtours (Ctr. for Competition & Regulation, CCR 
Working Paper No. 02-6, 2002), available at http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.104
458!ccr02-6.pdf.  For the argument that this notion can be applied to section 2 jurisprudence, 
see Dunn, supra note 42, at 243.  Interestingly, the concept of collective dominance has 
not been widely accepted in Europe. See, e.g., Raffaelli, supra note 43, at 924. 
87. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227
(1993) (emphasis added). 
 88. Turner, supra note 45, at 682. 
89. See, e.g., Matthew M. Bunda, Note, Monsanto, Matsushita, and “Conscious 
Parallelism”: Towards a Judicial Resolution of the “Oligopoly Problem,” 84 WASH. U.
L. REV. 179, 206 (2006). 
90. See, e.g., Conscious Parallelism—Fact or Fancy?, supra note 28, at 679; 
Kotalik, supra note 44, at 116–17. 
91. Joshua & Jordan, supra note 26, at 651. 
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The Sherman Act . . . rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions.  But even were that premise open to
question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.92 
As such, restraints of trade such as conscious parallelism can and should
be deemed violations of the Act.93 Put bluntly, the “focus of the 
Sherman Act thus must be shifted from a preoccupation with conspiratorial 
behavior to a greater concern for harm to the public and injury to
competition.”94 
2.  Clayton and FTC Acts 
The Clayton and FTC Acts present additional possibilities of
addressing conscious parallelism.  The most important provision in the
Clayton Act of 1914, section 7, prohibits mergers that have an
anticompetitive effect.95  The provision’s import in the context of
conscious parallelism is quite straightforward: to the extent the merger
would increase concentration it would facilitate conscious parallelism; as 
such, section 7 permits courts to interdict changes in market structure 
that would facilitate coordination.96  A former Chairman of the FTC
even suggests that “conscious parallelism remains a prime consideration
under coordinated effects analysis because the enforcement agencies’
reviews of mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act look to prospective
92. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (emphasis added). 
93. See, e.g., Conant, supra note 84, at 825. 
 94. Simonetti, supra note 34, at 1229. 
95. Section 7 of the Clayton Act states: 
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share 
capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also 
in commerce . . . where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006); see also Carstensen, supra note 85, at 491 (noting how section 7 
clarifies that mergers are in fact “subject to the antitrust law”).  For a general overview of
section 7, see Stuart D. Gurrea & Bruce M. Owen, Coordinated Interaction and Clayton § 7
Enforcement, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 89 (2003). 
96. Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated
Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 149 n.65 (2002); 
see also Brodley, supra note 77, at 327. 
 605
























   
     
 
   
  
  
effects and do not require a prediction of illegal conduct to justify a 
challenge.”97 The central point here is that the Clayton Act can be used 
to stop or modify mergers that might engender conditions propitious to 
conscious parallelism—whether the agencies have in fact done this
adequately is beside the point.
Finally, the FTC Act of 1914 could be profitably used as a tool against 
conscious parallelism.  Its central prohibition, articulated in section 5, is 
simply that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are 
hereby declared unlawful.”98  Most specifically the purpose of this
Article, section 5 does not require agreement or conspiracy99 and thus
“provides an opportunity to avoid the restrictions evidenced by cases 
such as Theatre Enterprises.”100  Further, as scholars have pointed out,
there would be procedural advantages to having an expert administrative 
agency articulate standards to address a challenging phenomenon such 
as conscious parallelism—an evolution that would be unlikely to be as 
well-defined through litigation.101  In addition, the FTC Act’s exclusive
reliance on civil remedies could provide a lower-risk environment within 
which to craft doctrines responsive to conscious parallelism.102 
More generally, the FTC Act is perhaps ideally suited to complex
phenomena such as conscious parallelism given its “wide-ranging, interstitial
function.”103  As one commentator notes:
 97. Majoras, supra note 71, at 2 n.1. 
98. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
99. See, e.g., Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust
Analysis of Facilitating Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 WIS. L. REV. 887, 915; Mund, 
supra note 82, at 166. 
 100. Leslie Aldor, Oligopolistic Conscious Parallelism Under the Competition Law
of the USA, 16 FED. L. REV. 74, 90 (1986). 
101. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 96, at 193; Kovacic, supra note 54, at 107.  See 
generally William H. Page, The FTC’s Procedural Advantage in Discovering Concerted 
Action (Feb. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342783 
(arguing that the FTC, which has section 5 of the FTC Act at its disposal, has a procedural 
advantage over private plaintiffs).
102. Cf. Sargent, supra note 78, at 2112 (“[S]ection 5 of the FTC Act is particularly
well-suited for addressing facilitating practices and other forms of tacit collusion.”). 
103. Paul D. Connuck, “Shared Monopoly,” “Conscious Parallelism” and an Approach
to Oligopoly Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 165, 
184 (1982). 
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Congress conferred FTC power broadly because it wisely recognized in 1914
that businessmen were ingenious, so that if Congress merely established a 
laundry list of unfair practices, businessmen would always devise ways to avoid
them.  There would then be a constant need for new legislation or other corrective
action.  The flexibility that the FTC received under section 5 allowed it to issue
a complaint and at least test whether a particular fact pattern constituted unlawful or
anticompetitive behavior.104 
It is therefore no surprise that “[s]ection 5 has been a continuing source 
of attraction to the FTC and commentators as a means of attacking 
facilitating practices and forms of interfirm coordination that may defy
characterization as an agreement for Sherman Act purposes.”105  Indeed, in 
maintaining the breadth of the FTC Act,106 the FTC has tried to use
section 5 to combat conscious parallelism107 but has faced significant 
political pressure to back down.108 
In the end, it is very tempting to argue that antitrust laws—drafted 
back in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—are antiquated 
and thus incapable of dealing adequately with conscious parallelism.109 
104. Panel and Audience Discussion on Shared-Monopoly Theories, 12 SW. U. L.
REV. 249, 265 (1981) (statement of George Zervas). 
 105. Kovacic, supra note 54, at 107; see also Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Doctrinal Cross-
Dressing in Derivative Aftermarkets: Kodak, Xerox and the Copycat Game, 51 
ANTITRUST BULL. 215, 224 (2006) (“At the very least, it is time to revisit the boundaries
of section 5 and reconsider its application to practices that may fall outside the Sherman 
Act, especially strategic parallel conduct.”); Sargent, supra note 78, at 2114 (“In fact, 
section 5 of the FTC Act remains the best weapon for eliminating collusion resulting
from facilitating practices.”); Michael G. Vita, Fifteen Years After Ethyl: The Past and
Future of Facilitating Practices, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 991, 991 (2001) (“[T]he Federal 
Trade Commission brought suit against four manufacturers of lead-based antiknock
compound . . . alleging that they had violated Section 5 . . . by engaging in certain
marketing practices that had the effect of reducing or eliminating price competition in 
the market for this product.”).  For a more restrictive reading of section 5, see Harry
Steinberg, Note, Oligopolistic Interdependence: The FTC Adopts a “No Agreement” 
Standard To Attack Parallel Non-Collusive Practices, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 255 (1984). 
106. See, e.g., George A. Hay, The Meaning of “Agreement” Under the Sherman
Act: Thoughts from the “Facilitating Practices” Experience, 16 REV. INDUS. ORG. 113, 
116 (2000). 
107. For examples of FTC proceedings, see Kevin J. Arquit, The Boundaries of
Horizontal Restraints: Facilitating Practices and Invitations To Collude, 61 ANTITRUST
L.J. 531 (1993).  A particularly salient example was the FTC’s attempt to stem conscious 
parallelism in the ready-to-eat cereal market. See Schmalensee, supra note 13, at 305. 
108. See, e.g., Aldor, supra note 100, at 91; Kovacic, supra note 50, at 66; Panel
and Audience Discussion on Shared-Monopoly Theories, supra note 104, at 266. 
109. See, e.g., Brodley, supra note 77, at 293; Sargent, supra note 78, at 2092. 
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One might even go so far as to argue the statute should be rewritten.110 
As this Article has argued, however, the existing laws provide multiple 
approaches to addressing the problem of conscious parallelism. What 
explains this discrepancy?  Perhaps path dependence: Turner’s point of
view on section 1 was the first to gain wide acceptance111 and is even cited 
by the Supreme Court to this day.112  However, a cynic might wonder 
whether the curious and undue focus on conspiracy—rather than actual 
effect on consumers—provides convenient cover for oligopolists.113 
This concern is especially vivid given the range of statutory provisions 
available to address conscious parallelism—not to mention that it would 
be possible to create a presumption against parallelism, placing the
burden of differentiating between competition and collusion on the 
defendants engaged in the parallel conduct.114  Perhaps the current state
of anemic enforcement might have more to do with the realpolitik of
cabining antitrust than with actual limitations in the laws.115 
110. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 42, at 252; cf. Simonetti, supra note 34, at 1232
(“[T]he position that such an antiquated law should be allowed to regulate parallel business 
activity that has a direct and harmful effect upon the national economy has become 
increasingly untenable.”). 
111. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 52, at 400 (“Judicial unwillingness to accept 
supracompetitive pricing alone as dispositive evidence of collusion may result, in part,
from historical accident: the Turner view won acceptance first.”).
112. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007). 
113. Cf. Conant, supra note 84, at 817 (“The confusion of the courts in searching
for conspiracy when the adherence by the firms in the market to an unreasonable
restraint of trade was the real question before them has muddled and impeded the growth
of the antitrust laws in attacking this type of multi-firm monopoly manifestation.”). 
114. See, e.g., MacLeod, supra note 19, at 40 (“If firms were observed to always
match competitor’s price changes rather than ‘independently’ setting price, then this is
prima facie evidence of collusion.”); cf. Mund, supra note 82, at 168–69 (“On the basis 
of empirical evidence and economic analysis, the legal doctrine that identical bidding is
consistent with effective competition should be replaced with a working rule making 
identical bidding a presumption of illegal conduct lessening competition and restraining
trade.”).  International experience might also prove illuminating.  See, e.g., Gönenç Gürkaynak, 
Comment: The Problem of Proof Under Turkish Competition Law, INT’L FIN. L. REV., 
Jan. 2002, at 12, 13 (noting that under Turkish competition law “[t]he mere establishment of
an appearance of parallel behaviour in a relevant market is sufficient to shift the burden 
of proof to the investigated enterprises.”).
115. Cf. Rodger, supra note 25, at 25 (“The theoretical assumptions underlying 
many of the legal approaches to antitrust are interesting, both generally and within the specific
‘oligopoly’ problem, as approaches to the specific depend a great deal on perceptions of
the wider role of antitrust law and policy.”).
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III. ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
To the extent legal possibilities exist, as Part II has argued, the 
pressing question then becomes how to discern instances of conscious
parallelism.  Here, law can look to economics to try to address the 
essential question: is the parallelism a function of competition or 
collusion?116  Part III will first discuss basic insights that emerge from 
the literature of industrial organization (IO) with a focus on two 
applications: game theory and the “structure-conduct-performance”     
(S-C-P) paradigm.  It then discusses whether and how ideas that might
emerge are applicable to the problem of conscious parallelism, including 
illustration through several examples from different industries. 
A.  Basic Insights from Industrial Organization 
Most germane to understanding conscious parallelism is IO, a branch 
of microeconomics that seeks to get beyond conventional price theory
toward understanding how firms actually interact in markets.  Within IO, 
the two most relevant analytical concepts to conscious parallelism are 
game theory and the S-C-P paradigm. 
1.  Game Theory 
At first glance, game theory looks to offer promising insights into
conscious parallelism.  After all: 
Oligopoly firms face a situation that resembles a contest or a game.  Each
firm has to choose a strategy that will maximize its profits, taking into consideration 
its rivals’ strategies and reactions to the firm’s actions.  Each firm’s profit depends 
upon its rivals’ strategies and therefore the logic guiding each firm’s decisions 
is within the domain of game theory.117 
Earlier generations of game theorists used single-period games to
determine whether collusion—as defined by a “market outcome in
which prices are above the competitive level, identified by the 
116. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 96, at 169; Conscious Parallelism—Fact or 
Fancy?, supra note 28, at 693; Stanbury & Reschenthaler, supra note 20, at 627. 
 117. Guy Sagi, The Oligopolistic Pricing Problem: A Suggested Price Freeze Remedy, 
2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 269, 277. 
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equilibrium of the static (one shot) game”118—existed.  The problem
with such models, of course, is that in the real world competitors interact
repeatedly.119 As a consequence, the emphasis in game theory justifiably 
shifted to dynamic games.120 Thus, beginning in the 1980s, “game theoretic
principles illustrate[d] how in a context of repeated interaction firms
[could] suspend competition and collude, and suggest[ed] that this collusion 
[could] be tacit.”121  Put more simply, a new generation of game theorists
demonstrated “that short-run and long-run rationality differed radically— 
with cooperation supplanting the logic of competition in the long run.”122 
Perhaps these models merely confirmed intuition; after all, the “key to
tacit collusion is that when firms interact repeatedly, they may react not 
only to fundamental market conditions but also to each other’s past
behaviour.”123 
The problem, unfortunately, is that game-theoretic models of oligopoly
are indeterminate.  Results depend on a complex interplay of context-
specific factors ultimately too technical to be of much help to antitrust: 
 118. Paolo Buccirossi, Does Parallel Behavior Provide Some Evidence of Collusion?, 2
REV. L. & ECON. 85, 88 (2006). 
119. See, e.g., J.W. Friedman, Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly, 35
REV. ECON. STUD. 257, 259–61 (1968); Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the 
Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST
L.J. 719, 759 (2003). 
120. See, e.g., Gurrea & Owen, supra note 95, at 103.  See generally Eric Maskin & 
Jean Tirole, A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with
Large Fixed Costs, 56 ECONOMETRICA 549 (1988); Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, A Theory
of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth 
Cycles, 56 ECONOMETRICA 571 (1988). 
121. Félix E. Mezzanotte, Can the Commission Use Article 82EC To Combat Tacit 
Collusion? 5 (ESRC Ctr. for Competition Policy, Working Paper No. 09-05, 2009), 
available at http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.111282!ccp09-5.pdf. 
122. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Reciprocal Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1922 (1988); see also Normann, supra note 
42, at 344 (“Even when firms are asymmetric there are potential gains from colluding
through conscious parallelism, and rational firms will take advantage of this.” (citation
omitted)); Margaret E. Slade, Vancouver’s Gasoline-Price Wars: An Empirical Exercise
in Uncovering Supergame Strategies, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 257, 259 (1992) (“[W]hen a
game is repeated many times, solutions that have a collusive flavour can emerge.”); see 
generally Dennis A. Yao & Susan S. DeSanti, Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of 
Tacit Collusion, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 113 (1993) (discussing the various ways that game 
theory can help answer difficult antitrust law questions). 
 123. IVALDI ET AL., supra note 2, at 17; see also Lopatka & Page, supra note 44, at 
675 (“Game theory suggests that competitors may be able to raise prices to supra-
competitive levels without overt communication or explicit agreement simply by taking
each other’s anticipated reactions into account in setting their own prices.”); Peritz, 
supra note 105, at 3 (“[S]trategic conduct can stabilize concentrated markets to produce 
cooperation among firms who learn to act on their common interests and seek to avoid at 
least some kinds of competition—typically on price.”). 
610
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[I]nfinite repetition of the game without too much discounting; potentially
infinite repetition with an exogenous and known probability that the repetition
will terminate after any given round; finite repetition in which the players do not
know how many rounds remain; finite repetition between players who have a 
small but positive likelihood of being “crazy” or irrationally cooperative; and
construction of a metagame in which players choose conditional strategies that 
can depend upon the choices made by the other player.124 
This instability is known to game theorists as the Folk Theorem, which 
“does not state that a set of jointly profit-maximizing quantities is the
equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game, but rather only that it is an
equilibrium.”125  Put more simply and usefully, in Franklin Fisher’s
words: 
A great many outcomes are known to be possible.  The context in which the theory
is set is important, with outcomes depending on what variables the oligopolists
use and how they form conjectures about each other.  A leading class of cases
concerns the joint-maximization solution and when it will or will not be achieved. 
The answer to the latter question is also known to be very dependent on the 
context and experience of the oligopolists.126 
Game theory, at least how it has evolved today, does not provide much 
insight to policymakers on the problem of conscious parallelism.
Regrettably then, “[a]lthough the infusion of industrial economics by
game theory has been marked by great technical advances, this precision
is of limited use for the purpose of advising policy makers about rules 
for business behaviour.”127 
 124. Wiley, supra note 122, at 1919 (footnotes omitted); cf. Nielsen, supra note 2,
at 540 (“Even though the price-output equilibrium for either a competitive market or a 
monopoly can generally be explained by an appropriate model, the same cannot be done 
for an oligopoly. Mutual interdependence, uncertainty, nonprice variables such as advertising
and product differentiation, and nonprofit maximization goals combine to yield of rich variety
of possible models.”).
 125. Werden, supra note 119, at 730. 
 126. Fisher, supra note 39, at 117. 
127. Ronald Harstad et al., Intertemporal Pricing Schemes: Experimental Tests of 
Consciously Parallel Behaviour in Oligopoly, in APPLIED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 123, 
124 (Louis Phlips ed., 1998); cf. Stanley E. Boyle & Thomas F. Hogarty, Pricing Behavior in
the American Automobile Industry, 1957–71, 24 J. INDUS. ECON. 81, 81 (1975)
(“Oligopoly pricing models, from the simplified form of administered pricing behavior
. . . to more sophisticated forms of the game-theoretic type, have had limited success.”). 
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2.  Structure-Conduct-Performance 
Perhaps the S-C-P paradigm of IO—in which market structure (S)
influences conduct (C), which in turn affect firm performance (P)128— 
might provide a more useful analytical tool toward differentiating 
collusion from competition where parallelism exists. 
a.  Conduct
Within this tripartite division, conventional analysis focuses
overwhelmingly on conduct.  Richard Posner, for instance, “would limit
inquiry by and large to conduct—how the firms behave—and more 
narrowly still to conduct from which an absence of effective competition 
can be inferred: cartel-like conduct.”129  Most importantly, intent is used 
as the most important proxy in determining whether or not the conduct is 
anticompetitive or not130—to wit, the most important plus factors center
on the defendant’s motive and self-interest.131  This standard approach,
however, is singularly unhelpful.  At the most basic level, as Herbert 
Hovenkamp notes, “[C]ompetitive and anticompetitive intent are so 
difficult to tell apart.”132  Although, trying to divine intent, even assuming it
could be done,133 is not even the correct question.  After all, “[d]espite
its beneficial social effects, competition is costly for market participants, 
so many prefer to avoid it.  If participants in a market can arrange to
collude, they can reduce competition and increase their profits, perhaps 
even approaching what a monopolist would earn.”134 
128. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1–2
(1988); VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 49, at 61–65. 
 129. Posner, supra note 38, at 1583. 
130. See, e.g., Piraino, supra note 4, at 32. 
131. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 132. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 51
(2005). 
133. See, e.g., Brodley, supra note 77, at 357–58 (“It is difficult enough for a court 
to reconstruct the intent of a specific individual.  The determination of what a large
corporation acting through staff agencies, committees, officers, and directors intends to 
do—not merely in the present, but at some future time as well—involves the proceedings 
in a vast labyrinth of evidence.”).
134. Andrew P. Morriss & Nathaniel Stewart, Market Fragmenting Regulation:
Why Gasoline Costs So Much (and Why It’s Going To Cost More), 72 BROOK. L. REV.
939, 949 (2007).  In the candid words of one article in the business press, “[b]usinessmen, by
and large, don’t like free and open markets.  From John D. Rockefeller on, they have 
found markets to be messy, chaotic and insufficiently profitable.”  Alan Murray, Exile on 
G Street: Bush’s Economists Play Peripheral Role, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2003, at A4; 
see also Panel and Audience Discussion on Shared-Monopoly Theories, supra note 104, 
at 261 (discussing the fact that “people are adverse to competition” and how even in
612
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The upshot is “that the difference between unlawful ‘tacit collusion’ 
and lawful oligopolistic interdependence is not to be found in any phrase 
that describes the state of mind of the industry participants.”135  As  
Senator Sherman himself observed: 
In providing a remedy the intention of the combination is immaterial.  The 
intention of a corporation can not be proven.  If the natural effects of its acts are 
injurious, if they tend to produce evil results, if their policy is denounced by the 
law as against the common good, it may be restrained, be punished with a penalty or
with damages . . . .  It is the tendency of a corporation, and not its intention, that 
the courts can deal with.136 
Note, of course, that in contrast to Sherman’s admonition and common
sense, the obsession the law has had, through the plus factors approach, 
with divining intent.137 
Once one gets beyond the awkward fascination with intent, the
conduct prong of the S-C-P framework does provide some insight.  The 
most obvious sign of collusion is identical bidding.138 More broadly, the
key is to inquire whether firms are adopting very specific practices that
might serve as signals to other companies and thus facilitate conscious 
parallelism.139 
The overarching theme among these practices is their ability to serve 
as a conduit for the exchange of critical business data such as price, sales 
1897 “the concerns of small and individual businesses were focused—as they are now— 
upon entering and surviving in the competitive jungle” (statement of Max Blecher)). 
 135. Hay, supra note 106, at 127–28; cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Areeda-Turner
Treatise in Antitrust Analysis, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 815, 817–18 (1996) (“‘Intent’ is usually a
meaningless and almost always unadministrable concept in antitrust litigation . . . .”).
 136. 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). 
137. Cf. Rodger, supra note 25, at 31 (“The quest for proof of agreement or 
conspiracy may be complicated by a lack of direct evidence: cases invariably depend on 
indirect or circumstantial evidence of parties’ intent.”).  Harvey Saferstein, a former regional
director of the FTC in Los Angeles, made the following statement:
In both of the Commission’s shared-monopoly cases, there apparently is an 
attempt to keep out the issue of conduct.  The Commission’s feeling is that the 
question of conduct is a bottomless pit.  Similarly, in the area of monopoly, the 
FTC has been trying to avoid having to prove bad intent. 
Panel and Audience Discussion on Shared-Monopoly Theories, supra note 104, at 274 
(statement of Harvey Saferstein); see also id. at 247–48 (discussing the professional 
background of each member of the panel). 
138. See, e.g., William S. Comanor & Mark A. Schankerman, Identical Bids and
Cartel Behavior, 7 BELL J. ECON. 281, 281 (1976). 
139. See, e.g., Lopatka & Page, supra note 44, at 675. 
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volume, or cost.140  Most simply, price announcements could serve this
function.141  More subtly, industry practices such as price protection 
guarantees,142 resale price maintenance,143 or even most-favored customer
provisions144 effectively provide important information to competitors on
price, making mimicry easier.  Even less directly, industry associations145 and 
product standardization146 can serve the same communicative function. 
As one commentator sums it up:
Facilitating practices can take a variety of forms: information exchange, trade
associations, price leadership (one firm sets prices and other firms set the same
price after a short period of time), collaborative research and cross-licensing of 
patents, most-favored-nation and meeting-competition clauses in buyer-seller
contracts, resale price maintenance (manufacturers set a floor on the prices retailers 
can sell the product, preventing the possibility of collusive agreements being 
ineffective at the retail level), basing point pricing (information on transportation 
charges and prices is exchanged resulting in uniform prices for the delivered
product), and common costing books (which specify a cost formula for a given
set of product specifications leading to price uniformity).147 
Systemically, antitrust doctrine has evolved to allow these practices— 
exactly the opposite result that one would desire.148  More specifically, 
as Part IV will argue, specific remedies can be fashioned to target these 
behaviors. 
140. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 99, at 900; Sargent, supra note 78, at 2066; cf.
MARC IVALDI ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF TACIT COLLUSION, FINAL REPORT FOR DG
COMPETITION, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 22 (2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_of_tacit_collusion_en.pdf (“The lack of transparency
on prices and sales does not necessarily prevent collusion completely, but makes it both 
more difficult to sustain and more limited in scope.”).
141. See, e.g., Blechman, supra note 51, at 901; Harstad et al., supra note 127, at 
147–48; Sargent, supra note 78, at 2066. 
142. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 43, at 385; Sargent, supra note 78, at 2075. 
143. See, e.g., Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey, Resale Price Maintenance and
Collusion, 38 RAND J. ECON. 983, 997 (2007). 
144. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 99, at 901–02; Vita, supra note 105, at 997. 
145. See, e.g., David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Rules, Communication, and
Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 379, 
383 (2001); Hillel Bavli, Comment, A Model of Abstract Cooperation in Games of
Uncertainty, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 832 (2005). 
146. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 99, at 935; Sargent, supra note 78, at 2067; cf.
IVALDI ET AL., supra note 140, at 46 (“When firms are differentiated by levels of quality, 
collusion is more difficult, the larger the competitive advantage of the high-quality 
firm.”). 
147. Gurrea & Owen, supra note 95, at 101 n.30; see also Zellmer, supra note 3, at
852–53 (discussing the various methods firms within an “oligopolistic industry might 
use to avoid price competition”).
148. Consider, for example, that a recent Supreme Court case has overturned nearly
a century of jurisprudence and ruled that resale price maintenance is no longer a per se
violation but rather merely subject to a rule of reason analysis.  See Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007). 
614
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Beyond facilitating practices, one other behavioral phenomenon 
provides a telltale sign to discern competition from collusion: price 
wars.149  Price wars do not occur in competitive industries in which 
price is set based on supply and demand characteristics.150  Perhaps 
counterintuitively then, “[p]rice wars, while tending to occur infrequently,
are a dominant feature of the oligopolistic situation.”151  As one commentator
notes: 
The essence of oligopoly is that the firms possess at least a modicum of 
discretionary economic power.  Failure to coordinate their behaviour effectively
can, in the extreme, result in bouts of commercial “warfare” in which the price, 
profit and output of the oligopoly closely resemble that of a competitive industry. 
On the other hand, perfectly coordinated behaviour can result in a cartel which 
exhibits the performance characteristics of a monopoly.152 
In sum, if the conduct prong of S-C-P remains focused on intent—as in
current doctrine—it is not much use.  If instead, however, the law uses
the existence of facilitating practices and price wars as indicators of 
conscious parallelism, then conduct analysis becomes quite useful in 
distinguishing competition from collusion.  But the inquiry can only
begin with conduct.
b.  Structure
A greater focus on industry structure would also shed much light on
the problem of conscious parallelism. The point here is straightforward: 
oligopolistic market structures breed the phenomenon.153 In an oligopoly,
149. “A price war is a period in which the firms in an industry or market set prices 
that are significantly below the usually prevailing prices, generally implying a change in 
strategy within a set of oligopolists.”  Meghan Busse, Firm Financial Condition and Airline
Price Wars, 33 RAND J. ECON. 298, 299 (2002). 
150. See, e.g., MacLeod, supra note 19, at 41 (“If firms are at a static Nash
equilibrium such wars will of course not occur.”).
 151. Rothschild, supra note 35, at 317. 
152. Stanbury & Reschenthaler, supra note 20, at 623.  The classic study in this 
regard is Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under 
Imperfect Price Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87 (1984).  See also Baker, supra note 
96, at 165 (discussing the difficulties associated with price coordination and how
“occasional price wars . . . are not inconsistent with coordination” because price wars can be
“part of the mechanism by which cheating is deterred during high-price periods”); Busse, 
supra note 149 (discussing the different models of price wars, which fall “into three classes”
that are “distinguished by when and why price wars occur”). 
153. See supra Part II.A.1.
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the number of sellers is small; by contrast, “[c]ollusion is a difficult
game to play when the number of conspiring rivals is large.”154  In the 
words of one commentator: 
Competition will be most effective in a market in which there are many sellers,
none of which has any significant market share.  In such a market no single 
seller or group of sellers acting in concert has the power to choose its level of
profits by giving less or charging more.  Where the number of sellers is limited,
however, competition gives way to parallel policies of mutual advantage.  In
such a market, prices tend to be established by administration rather than
competition.  Small firms may be content to follow the high prices set by the 
industry leaders. The growth of oligopoly has an adverse effect upon small business 
and local control of industry.  The preservation of potential competition becomes 
particularly vital in oligopolistic markets.155 
As Turner himself points out, “a substantial departure from competitive 
structure is an essential condition for interdependent conscious 
parallelism to take place—i.e., the number of sellers must be ‘few.’”156 
Put more simply, structural analysis is important because “[c]onscious 
parallel action is really a problem of concentration rather than conspiracy”157 
to the point where “[m]ost economists believe . . . that structural conditions 
in a particular oligopoly, not the nature of decisions, determine which 
model of behavior a firm adopts.”158 
When structural conditions are favorable, overt collusion is not
needed159—by tacitly colluding, oligopolists achieve the same socially
undesirable outcome but escape legal sanction.160  Ironically then, tacit 
collusion becomes the preferred mode of operation when structural 
conditions permit it: 
Explicit price-fixing agreements, however, are usually not durable . . . . 
By contrast, oligopolists’ tacit collusion is both more durable and more difficult 
to discover than an explicit price-fixing cartel.  Because tacit price-fixing arrangements 
spring from the very nature of oligopolistic markets, they are likely to persist for
long periods of time. 
 154. ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 21, at 117: see also F.T. Dolbear et al., Collusion
in Oligopoly: An Experiment on the Effect of Numbers and Information, 82 Q.J. ECON. 
240, 259 (1968) (“[A] decrease in the number of firms in a market produces less
competition which cannot be attributed to differences in the structure of the profit 
functions.”); cf. Gurrea & Owen, supra note 95, at 113 (“Generally, experiments find
that more sellers yield more competitive outcomes.”).
 155. Brodley, supra note 77, at 298 (footnotes omitted). 
 156. Turner, supra note 45, at 678. 
157. Conscious Parallelism—Fact or Fancy?, supra note 28, at 686. 
 158. Levins, supra note 36, at 192. 
159. Cf. Fraas & Greer, supra note 37, at 43 (“[F]ormal cartels arise most often 
where the structural conditions are not particularly favorable to collusion.”). 
160. See, e.g., Connuck, supra note 103, at 171. 
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Not only is tacit collusion more durable than express collusion, it is also more
difficult to detect and to prosecute.161 
Given the benefits of conscious parallelism, one might even go so far as 
to suggest that “where explicit price fixing is practiced, the only
alternative open to the conspirators is competitive behavior.”162 
Beyond simply the concentration of sellers,163 economists have identified
a number of other factors to consider when analyzing market structure.164 
Firms of similar size, producing similar products, make conscious 
parallelism easier.165  High barriers to entry stifle new competitors and 
similarly can fuel tacit understandings among existing players.166 
Markets in which production capacity is routinely greater than output 
might suggest firms are tacitly colluding to restrict output.167  Additionally, 
significant cross-ownership among competitors can help facilitate
information exchange, making conscious parallelism easier.168 By
contrast, markets exhibiting high rates of innovation,169 powerful
buyers,170 cost asymmetries,171 as well as demand fluctuations172 and 
elasticity173 are less prone to tacit collusion.  Although these structural
characteristics are helpful, a meaningful analysis of the conscious
parallelism is still incomplete without the third prong of S-C-P: 
performance.
 161. Piraino, supra note 4, at 30; cf. VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 49, at 117 (“Firms 
would prefer to solve the coordination problem without overt communication.”). 
162. John R. Carter, Collusion, Efficiency, and Antitrust, 21 J.L. & ECON. 435, 442
(1978). 
163. See, e.g., IVALDI ET AL., supra note 140, at 13. 
164. Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment appears in IVALDI ET AL., supra
note 2, and IVALDI ET AL., supra note 140.  See generally George Symeonidis, In Which
Industries Is Collusion More Likely? Evidence from the UK, 51 J. INDUS. ECON. 45 (2003) 
(examining the impact of a number of “industry characteristics on pricing conduct” and
ultimately concluding, in part, that collusion is more likely to occur when there is a 
“higher degree of capital intensity”).
165. See, e.g., IVALDI ET AL., supra note 2, at 20. 
166. See, e.g., IVALDI ET AL., supra note 140, at 19. 
167. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 38, at 1579–80. 
168. See, e.g., IVALDI ET AL., supra note 140, at 53. 
169. See, e.g., id. at 35.
170. See, e.g., id. at 53.
171. See, e.g., id. at 39; Normann, supra note 42, at 363. 
172. See, e.g., IVALDI ET AL., supra note 140, at 32. 
173. See, e.g., id. at 52.
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The final element of the S-C-P framework, performance, is the most
underutilized.  This Article argues, however, that it is also the most 
important variable in assessing whether or not conscious parallelism 
exists.  The core of the claim is straightforward: rather than focus on the 
intent of businesses, we should actually focus on the effect those practices 
have, as measured by the performance of the firm.174 
Various metrics can be used to measure performance.  To the extent
businesses want to be “big,” one could look at relative market shares
over time.  As one might expect, market shares characterized by
asymmetries175 and instability176 point away from conscious parallelism.
However, the most important measure of performance is profitability.177 
Put simply, abnormally high profit margins, combined with parallelism, 
suggest that what is going on is actually collusion, not competition.178  In 
a similar vein, “[u]nsatisfactory profit performances may motivate firms
to collude.”179  Economists have even characterized tacit collusion
succinctly as “a market conduct that enables firms to obtain supra-
normal profits.”180 
A more sophisticated, performance-based analysis would investigate 
the interactions between four variables: price, output, cost, and demand. 
174. Cf. Appel, supra note 17, at 406 (“The solution to this problem requires an 
expansion of the current application of antitrust law to focus more on the effect than the
intent of questionable business practices to provide better consumer protection in
keeping with the goals of the legislation.”).
175. See, e.g., IVALDI ET AL., supra note 140, at 16. 
176. See Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, Collusive Pricing with Capacity 
Constraints in the Presence of Demand Uncertainty, 23 RAND J. ECON. 203, 217
(1992). 
177. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 99, at 907. 
178. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 96, at 160 (“Moreover, empirical research suggests 
that there is a great deal of market power in some concentrated industries, and that 
anticompetitive conduct is a significant cause of high price-cost margins.”); Nye, supra
note 23, at 220 (“In any event, the sequence of events most likely connotes that a 
princely return was being made in the industry, necessarily at higher-than-competitive
prices, which persisted as long as things were chummy.”). 
179. Peter Asch & J.J. Seneca, Is Collusion Profitable?, 58 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 
7 (1976). 
 180. IVALDI ET AL., supra note 140, at 5; see also Vita, supra note 105, at 998 
(discussing the FTC’s allegation that these types of practices lead to “supracompetitive
prices”); cf.  MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 54 (2006) 
(“One can also think of some other possible approaches: perhaps the trigger for structural
intervention or monetary penalties could be evidence of high price-cost margins, rather 
than either high concentration (which need not always lead to high margins) or ‘tacitly
collusive’ behavior.  This has the advantage of focusing directly on the ultimate welfare 
concern.”).
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In a competitive market, price and output should rise or fall based on 
cost and demand; in a collusive market, price and output vary in ways
that are external to underlying cost181 and demand.182  As one commentator 
suggests, “Strong indications that firms are following accommodating 
interdependence are prices uniformly high relative to costs, and restricted
outputs even in the face of unmet demand.”183  For example, collusion is
likely when prices are increasing even though costs and demand are 
decreasing.184 
At last, one can discern the essence of conscious parallelism.  If the
parallelism is due to actual changes in factors of production—cost—or 
consumer interest—demand—then it indicates competition; on the other 
hand, if parallelism occurs independently of these variables, then
collusion is likely at work.  As one economist sums it up:
This behaviour describes precisely what we mean by conscious parallelism.
This is, if firm i announces a price change (increase or decrease) ΔPi, then other
firms respond by matching it.  This kind of response is quite different from what 
one might call unconscious parallelism.  For example, all firms might decrease
their prices by the same amount due to, say, a fall in industry demand.  In this 
case the signal for a price change is generated outside the industry.185 
Beyond its simplicity and intuitive appeal, two things are striking about
this formulation.  First, by acknowledging that firms may be pricing 
based on their interdependence and not supply and demand curves, we 
must move beyond the strictures of simplistic price theory.186  Second, 
181. See, e.g., Campbell Doerr, The Problem of Collusion: How Best To Resolve 
It?, 9 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 104, 113 (2000); Posner, supra note 38, at 1580. 
182. See, e.g., Piraino, supra note 4, at 65; Rothschild, supra note 35, at 314. 
 183. Levins, supra note 36, at 193 (footnote omitted); see also Baker, supra note
96, at 169 n.148 (“Coordinating firms might raise prices simultaneously in order to
exercise market power.  Competing firms also might raise prices simultaneously, in
response to a common cost increase or an increase in market demand.”). 
184. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 45, at 661 (“One can hardly find clearer evidence 
of an absence of effective competition than an increase of prices in the face of declining
costs and weakening demand.”).
 185. MacLeod, supra note 19, at 33. 
186. In industrial, as opposed to neoclassical, economics: 
The main methodological change was that price was no longer regarded as the 
sole outcome of impersonal market forces dictating a unique solution to the 
individual firms, but that it was realised that under imperfect competition the firms
themselves had a certain amount of freedom of action with regard to price, the 
nature of the product and selling expenditure.  The consequence was that 
analysis shifted from the industrial supply and demand curves to the cost and 
demand conditions of the individual firms . . . . 
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by remaining obsessed with concepts such as agreement and intent, 
American jurisprudence has largely ignored the insights performance-
based analysis might offer to the problem of conscious parallelism.187 
B.  New Applications 
Contemporary antitrust jurisprudence unfortunately either ignores or 
misapplies the S-C-P framework.  As one commentator laments, “With
the present emphasis apparently on explicit conspiracy and the plus
factor evidentiary approach, courts of the United States have failed to 
recognize the potential value of structural analysis and industry performance
data in detecting collusion in oligopolies.”188  Yet structural analysis by 
itself is incomplete as well.189  By refocusing—placing primary emphasis
on performance, while deemphasizing an intent-focused conduct 
inquiry—we can disentangle collusion from competition.  In doing so, 
we can finally tackle the problem of conscious parallelism and begin 
leaving decades of anemic policy.
One fruitful approach in many of the successful studies has been to 
investigate whether pricing levels or changes are reflective of underlying 
costs, or rather whether industry participants are maintaining their 
pricing levels for reasons that have nothing to do with the actual costs of 
providing the product to consumers.  The latter, of course, is reflective 
of tacit collusion. 
It is important to recognize at the outset that such an approach will 
require a rethinking of a jurisprudence unnecessarily focused on intent 
and agreement.  Consider the Supreme Court’s Brown & Williamson
Rothschild, supra note 35, at 300–01. 
187. Consider, for instance, Supreme Court jurisprudence that all but ignores 
whether the oligopolists were earning supracompetitive profits.  For the most recent example,
see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 188. Zellmer, supra note 3, at 844–45; see also Dennis W. Carlton et al., 
Communication Among Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
423, 424 (1997) (“There is, in general, no economic theory of the meaning of 
‘agreement’ wherein one may determine easily when communication leads to
anticompetitive results irrespective of the context of the events.”); Andrew Eckert & 
Douglas S. West, Price Uniformity and Competition in a Retail Gasoline Market, 56 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 219, 235 (2005) (examining the predictions of the competitive 
market model using a “probit model,” which hypothesizes that price depends on variables 
including market structure, and ultimately concluding that “tacitly collusive pricing behavior,”
as opposed to the competitive market model, explains the retail gasoline market in Vancouver). 
189. See, e.g., Neil B. Cohen & Charles A. Sullivan, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
and the New Antitrust Merger Guidelines: Concentrating on Concentration, 62 TEX. L.
REV. 453, 506 (1983) (“[G]iven the inherent theoretical and practical difficulties of the 
structuralist approach, a more direct analysis of market performance or conduct could be 
valuable.”).
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case in which uncontroverted evidence suggested that “[l]ist prices for 
cigarettes increased in lockstep, twice a year, for a number of years,
irrespective of the rate of inflation, changes in the costs of production, or 
shifts in consumer demand.”190  Yet even this performance evidence was 
not enough to convince six members of the Court that the tobacco 
companies were engaged in conscious parallelism—despite a vigorous 
dissent authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices White and
Blackmun.191 
By contrast, the straightforward yet effective approach this Article is 
suggesting has been successfully applied in the economics literature to a 
variety of problems.  Perhaps the best-known example is a study by
William Christie and Paul Schultz that begins with the simple 
observation that broker-dealers on the NASDAQ market were quoting 
stock prices in quarter points, not eighths.192  Their research led to the
conclusion that “the likely reason for the absence of odd-eighth quotes 
was an understanding or tacit agreement among dealers to maintain wide 
spreads [margins between ask and bid],”193 facilitated by the fact that all
bid-ask spreads are readily available on each broker-dealer’s computer
screen.194  Further confirming their findings that broker-dealers were not
pricing based on underlying cost was the fact that their margins declined 
after Christie and Schultz’s study came to light, “consistent with the 
hypothesis that spreads were not set competitively and declined as a 
190. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 213
(1993). 
191. As Justice Stevens observes: 
On this point, there is ample, uncontradicted evidence that the list prices on 
generic cigarettes, as well as the prices on branded cigarettes, rose regularly
and significantly during the late 1980’s, in a fashion remarkably similar to the 
price change patterns that characterized the industry in the 1970’s when
supracompetitive, oligopolistic pricing admittedly prevailed.  Given its knowledge 
of the industry’s history of parallel pricing, I think the jury plainly was entitled
to draw an inference that these increased prices were supracompetitive.
Id. at 255 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
192. See William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Policy Watch: Did Nasdaq Market
Makers Implicitly Collude?, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 199, 202 (1995) (“A closer inspection of
the individual market maker quotes quickly led to the discovery that these Nasdaq stocks 
were quoted exclusively in even-eighths. In other words, quotes rarely used any of the one-
eighth, three-eighths, five-eighths, or seven-eighths price fractions.”).  The study was conducted
in the days before decimalization. See id. at 201 & n.5.
 193. Paul Schultz, Regulatory and Legal Pressures and the Costs of Nasdaq Trading, 13
REV. FIN. STUD. 917, 918 (2000). 
194. See Christie & Schultz, supra note 192, at 203. 
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result of regulatory and legal pressure.”195  There are also a variety of 
studies finding tacit collusion in gasoline retailing.196  A cost-based 
approach has also been well applied to problems as varied as airline 
ticket prices197 and fuel surcharges,198 photographic film,199 and credit
card interchange fees.200 
Another fruitful approach is to compare the performance of a market 
exhibiting parallelism to one that is competitive: if the margins reveal
themselves to be higher, this would indicate that the parallelism is
reflective of tacit collusion; on the other hand, if they are comparable,
then the parallelism is likely the result of competition.  As Jerry
Hausman and Gregory Sidak suggest: 
 195. Schultz, supra note 193, at 952. 
196. See, e.g., Severin Borenstein & Andrea Shepard, Dynamic Pricing in Retail 
Gasoline Markets, 27 RAND J. ECON. 429, 448 (1996); Eckert & West, supra note 188,
at 234; Slade, supra note 122, at 273. 
197. See James A. Brander & Anming Zhang, Market Conduct in the Airline Industry: 
An Empirical Investigation, 21 RAND J. ECON. 567, 567–68 (1990). 
198. Airlines impose fuel surcharges simply based on the spot-price of fuel; as such, 
“[b]ecause the surcharge varies by the shipment’s chargeable weight regardless of origin 
or destination, there is no practical relationship between the weight and size of the cargo
shipped and the fuel actually consumed by an airliner carrying them.”  Appel, supra note 
17, at 393.  It is important to note further that: 
The key factor that implicates the oligopoly problem is that the scheme functions
just as effectively in the absence of active collusion.  In effect, the use of the 
spot-price index is a new form of price signaling that eliminates the need for
repeated communications between competitors: once the spot-price index of 
trigger points is established and tied to corresponding surcharges, the initiating
firm has signaled its intentions for all price levels to anyone with internet access.
Id. at 401. 
 199. Vrinda Kadiyali, Entry, Its Deterrence, and Its Accommodation: A Study of the 
U.S. Photographic Film Industry, 27 RAND J. ECON. 452, 454 (1996) (“The estimates of
the 1980–1990 duopoly show that Kodak and Fuji were tacitly colluding in the choice of
both price and advertising . . . .”).
200. For example, in 2003, the Reserve Bank of Australia implemented reforms 
requiring credit card interchange rates to be set according to a cost-based schedule and
banned no-surcharge rules, while capping surcharges at the amount of the merchant
discount fee.  See Levitin, supra note 10, at 70.  “[T]he average MasterCard and Visa
interchange rates in Australia have fallen by nearly half, from .95% of purchase price to
.50%, while the average merchant discount fees for MasterCard and Visa have fallen
from 1.40% of purchase price to .86%.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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In highly competitive markets with non-differentiated products, economists 
expect similar prices, and often similar business strategies, among competitors. 
Whether these prices and business strategies arise from unilateral profit
maximization or coordinated interaction is often not clear.  However, a price-based
economic analysis, which should be the central focus of any SMP [significant 
market power] analysis because consumers pay these prices, often resolves much of
the ambiguity.201 
For example, when faced with whether Irish cellular telephone operators 
were engaged in joint dominance, Hausman and Sidak’s approach
“compare[d] prices for mobile service in Ireland to those in the United 
Kingdom, where regulators had found the market to be ‘effectively 
competitive.’”202  The finding that “[p]rices in Ireland were lower than
prices in the United Kingdom” suggested that indeed the Irish market
was competitive.203  Similar benchmarking analyses have been conducted to
determine whether there was tacit collusion among sugar refiners in
Canada204 and have been suggested in the context of the market for 
gasoline additives in the United States.205 
Beyond the cost-based approach and comparisons to competitive
markets, the insightful economic studies rely on formulating a hypothesis, 
then using econometric data to prove or disprove it. For example, to test 
whether the establishment of a trade association has led to tacit collusion,
researchers have tested margins before and after the implementation of 
the association.206 Another indicator of tacit collusion might be forbearance
among competitors in competing for customers in business segments or 
geographies—economists have applied such an approach in markets as
varied as airline routes207 and school milk accounts.208  Alternatively, if
an industry acts in parallel to change the services it offers consumers,
201. Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Evaluating Market Power Using Competitive
Benchmark Prices Instead of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 387,
406–07 (2007). 
202. Id. at 389. 
203. Id. at 389–90. 
204. See Stanbury & Reschenthaler, supra note 20, at 649–50.
205. See Vita, supra note 105, at 1000. 
206. See Genesove & Mullin, supra note 145, at 381. 
207. See William N. Evans & Ioannis N. Kessides, Living by the “Golden Rule”: 
Multimarket Contact in the U.S. Airline Industry, 109 Q.J. ECON. 341, 365 (1994). 
208. See In K. Lee, Non-Cooperative Tacit Collusion, Complementary Bidding and
Incumbency Premium, 15 REV. INDUS. ORG. 115, 133 (1999). 
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one could look at industry performance before and after to assess 
whether the change facilitated tacit collusion.209 
Regardless of specific methodology, these successful studies present a 
common theme.  Rather than try to divine intent or agreement, they look 
at basic performance data—price, output, cost, demand—to determine
whether there is conscious parallelism.210 Happily, “[d]espite the
complexity of oligopoly pricing behaviour, relatively simple approaches 
to its analysis based upon straightforward profit objectives are capable of 
yielding useful predictions and cogent explanations.”211 
The best economic work on conscious parallelism thus reflects
careful, often unglamorous, econometric study—not grand theory.  As 
one economist has argued, there is “no general detective prescription, 
apart from the idea that the individual circumstances of the industry in 
question often suggest what a fruitful line of inquiry might be.  Case 
studies are inevitable.”212  The root of the problem is that there is no 
general theory of oligopoly that can then be applied.  As the economist 
who pioneered the study of oligopolies aptly noted:
209. A recent study has applied this method to health insurance companies in Chile: 
When Isapres [Instituciones de Salud Previsional (private health insurance 
companies in Chile)] decide to market a new plan that is allegedly more efficient 
and convenient for their customers, there is no reason under a competition 
hypothesis why they would lower their advertising and sales force expenditures,
why the transfer rate of customers within the “innovative” Isapres would decrease
or why the profits of both the accused and non-accused Isapres would rise. 
Claudio A. Agostini et al., Collusion in the Private Health Insurance Market: Empirical
Evidence for Chile 27 (May 16, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1149928.  These four factors are perfectly consistent with a collusion 
hypothesis and were empirically demonstrated: the operating margin rate of all Isapres
increased once the transition period to reduce plan coverage was over. See id.
210. See generally John M. Connor, Forensic Economics: An Introduction with
Special Emphasis on Price Fixing, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 31, 44–55 (2008) (describing
and explaining various methods of forensic analysis and the role that economic analysis 
plays in these types of cases).
 211. R.M. Grant, Pricing Behaviour in the UK Wholesale Market for Petrol 1970–
80: A “Structure-Conduct” Analysis, 30 J. INDUS. ECON. 271, 291 (1982); cf. Vita, supra
note 105, at 1004 (“However, the question is, do price-cost markups exceed the level that 
might be observed if industry equilibrium was characterized by noncollusive oligopoly
behavior?”).
 212. Porter, supra note 29, at 149. 
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These final comments on conjectural variations seem to lead us again not only to
the conclusion that oligopoly has no single solution; but beyond this to an appreciation
of the pitfalls which beset any attempt to bring its multifarious solutions within
the embrace of any single formula. It is a disturbing and recalcitrant problem,
especially to the mathematically minded theorist who insists upon having “the 
answer.”213 
Until there are marked advances in oligopoly theory, the most impactful 
economic work has been narrow analyses of specific industries.  As 
economists have pointed out, “the ease with which tacit collusion (joint 
maximization) does or does not take place has much to do with the 
particulars of the situation in which the oligopolists find themselves.”214 
Indeed, the emphasis on trying to enunciate an overarching paradigm— 
obviously tempting to the mathematical economist—has so far largely
been irrelevant to the real world.215  Unfortunately, the “typical industrial
organization economist interested in examining the behavior of firms in
market environments characterized by small numbers does not approach
his task with any unified set of analytical tools which one could call the 
theory of oligopoly.”216 
There is, to be sure, much more work to be done.  Methodologically, 
the theoretical lacuna invites greater focus on empirical work217—not to
mention on experimental economics, which has so far been only rarely 
 213. Chamberlin, supra note 33, at 218; see also Dolbear et al., supra note 154, at 
240 (“Despite considerable scholarly effort, no theory has provided reliable predictions 
of price or output in oligopoly markets.”); Stanbury & Reschenthaler, supra note 20, at 
623 (“Unlike the accepted theory of perfect competition . . . there are many theories of oligopoly
behaviour. To the extent that they are deterministic, they rely upon unrealistic assumptions.”).
 214. Fisher, supra note 39, at 121; see also ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 21, at 119
(“Undoubtedly the degree to which interdependence approximates prefect collusion varies
from industry to industry and situation to situation.”); Panel and Audience Discussion on 
Shared-Monopoly Theories, supra note 104, at 271 (“Economists are beginning to be 
able to discuss such questions meaningfully for certain specific industries, but cannot answer
in terms of any generally applicable theory.”) (statement of Robert Clower); Richard
Schmalensee, Collusion Versus Differential Efficiency: Testing Alternative Hypotheses, 
35 J. INDUS. ECON. 399, 420 (1987) (“It would appear likely that the relative importance 
of collusion and differential efficiency vary considerably among industries and over time.”).
215. Cf. Fisher, supra note 39, at 123 (“There is a strong tendency for even the best 
practitioners to concentrate on the analytically interesting questions rather than on the
ones that really matter for the study of real-life industries.  The result is often a perfectly
fascinating piece of analysis.  But so long as that tendency continues, those analyses will 
remain merely games economists play.”).
 216. Joskow, supra note 4, at 270. 
217. Cf. Morriss & Stewart, supra note 134, at 1058 (“Empirical questions can 
often be answered, if anyone cares to spend the time and money on research to do so.”).
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applied to conscious parallelism.218  Beyond methodology, much more
research, along several dimensions, is required to understand how 
conscious parallelism comes about.  First, and most pragmatically, to the 
extent financial reports are good indicators of performance, accounting 
standards might need upgrading to make it easier to identify instances of
conscious parallelism.219 
Second, the role of organizational behavior in fostering conscious 
parallelism needs to be understood.220 After all, the literature on the
intersection of management behavior and antitrust law is sparse221— 
except that, ironically, “[b]usiness school faculty teaching strategy
routinely counsel their students that managers working for oligopolists 
should implement practices that would facilitate coordination.”222 
Similarly, the role of interlocking directorships223 and firm cross-
ownership224 is only beginning to be seriously studied.  Thus, a principal
218. See, e.g., Kaie-Uwe Kühn, Collusion Theory in Search of Robust Themes: A 
Comment on Switgard Feuerstein’s Survey, 5 J. INDUSTRY COMPETITION & TRADE 207, 
214 (2005).  For applications of the experimental approach to conscious parallelism, see, 
for example, Enrique Fatas & Juan A. Mañez, Are Low-Price Promises Collusion 
Guarantees? An Experimental Test of Price Matching Policies, 9 SPANISH ECON. REV. 
59, 60–61 (2007); Harstad et al., supra note 127, at 125; and Christoph Engel, Tacit 
Collusion: The Neglected Experimental Evidence 2 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on 
Collective Goods, Preprint Paper No. 2007/14, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1020889. 
219. For example, one commentator has suggested: 
[E]ach conglomerate firm larger than a certain size . . . might be required to 
disclose or publish annually an operating statement for each product line, 
showing (1) net sales, (2) cost of goods sold (itemized to show individually the 
cost of goods purchased from affiliates, the cost of goods purchased from 
outside firms, and labor costs), (3) operating overhead, (4) net profit or loss 
from such product line, and (5) area of geographical operations. 
Brodley, supra note 77, at 363. 
220. See, e.g., MacLeod, supra note 19, at 26 (“Concepts such as tacit collusion can 
only be made precise once one begins to discuss signalling behaviour and social factors 
such as agreed upon rules of thumb.”). 
221. For two rare examples, see Jeffrey Sonnenfeld & Paul R. Lawrence, Why Do 
Companies Succumb to Price Fixing?, HARV. BUS. REV. July–Aug. 1978, at 145; and
Oliver P. Heil & Arlen W. Langvardt, The Interface Between Competitive Market
Signaling and Antitrust Law, J. MARKETING, July 1994, at 81. 
222. Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing,
the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 
197 (1993); see also Peritz, supra note 105, at 218 (explaining that game theory
emphasizes “[t]ransactions founded in the fundamental importance of predicting and
seeking to shape other parties’ reactions” and how the “game theoretic approach dominates
marketing and management scholarship”). 
223. See Rothschild, supra note 35, at 316. 
224. See generally David Gilo et al., Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion, 
37 RAND J. ECON. 81, 82 (2006) (examining how “partial cross ownership (PCO) 
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area of future research would be to move away from an arid abstraction 
of the firm toward an understanding of the organizational realities that 
either hinder or foster tacit collusion. 
Third, and more abstractly, the role of information in hindering or
facilitating conscious parallelism needs to be explored.  The central 
problem is that although information flow is generally considered to be 
positive, it can also make tacit collusion easier.225  The dilemma for
policymakers is a difficult one: 
 Given that firms have no individual incentive to share information in the
absence of collusive quantity setting, antitrust authorities are left with a difficult
choice.  They can attempt to promote or subsidize information transfer while making 
redoubled efforts to suppress cooperative play.  Or, if they think that shared
information presents just too inviting an environment for cooperative behavior, 
and they doubt their ability to control cooperation in an environment of 
homogeneous information, they may seek a safer, second-best equilibrium by
simply prohibiting information transfer.226 
What is certain, however, is that the information problem has been
dramatically understudied.227 
Notwithstanding these difficulties and areas for future research, IO 
can already shed much light on the problem of conscious parallelism.
The focus of the inquiry, as suggested by the S-C-P framework and the 
examples above, is perhaps surprisingly commonsensical: 
The performance conditions that most clearly indicate that the practices affect
competition adversely include: (1) persistently supracompetitive price and profit
levels; (2) substantially uniform transaction prices and price movements;
(3) relatively stable firm or brand market shares, particularly in the presence of
declining demand; and (4) price and profit changes that are not consistent with
changes in demand or supply conditions.228 
Put slightly differently, “the failure to take advantage of short-run profit 
possibilities by changing price, product, technology or marketing methods,
arrangements” raise antitrust concerns and studying “the effect of PCO on the ability of
firms to engage in tacit collusion”).
225. See, e.g., Richard N. Clarke, Collusion and the Incentives for Information 
Sharing, 14 BELL J. ECON. 383, 383 (1983). 
226. Id. at 392–93. 
227. See Russell B. Stevenson, Information and Rivalrous Competition, 48 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 671, 672 (1980) (“[O]ne of the principal causes of the difficulties in this
area is the dearth of serious scholarly analysis aimed at understanding the impact of 
increased information on competition.”).
 228. Clark, supra note 99, at 904. 
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or failure to react to changing underlying conditions of market structure 
and supply as reflected in costs, are significant evidence of the absence 
of competition.”229 
Note how far we have come from the search for “agreement” or
“conspiracy” in contemporary antitrust jurisprudence.230  After all,  
“[i]nstead of considering whether oligopolists have successfully 
coordinated their behavior to raise prices above the normal competitive 
level, the courts have engaged in an extended search for various ‘plus 
factors’ necessary to prove the existence of a formal agreement among
the defendants.”231  Unfortunately, though, 
this elevation of the conspiracy inquiry over economic effect has caused the 
courts to render a series of conflicting opinions that has, at best, confused many
as to the line between permissible and impermissible oligopoly conduct, or, at 
worst, perhaps even encouraged participants in concentrated markets to engage
in tacit collusion.232 
But why?  At least part of the answer lies in the fact that antitrust in 
recent decades has lost sight of its objective: improving consumer
welfare.  Those familiar with antitrust’s recent history will likely recall
that the Chicago School, in a rhetorical master stroke, touted “consumer 
welfare” while really pushing allocative efficiency.  For example, in his 
landmark book, The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork argues that the
“closer the members of the industry come to maximizing their profits, 
 229. Conant, supra note 84, at 812–13; cf. Zellmer, supra note 3, at 832 (“It is
argued that firms in oligopolies do not make price changes when supply and demand
fluctuate or when industry-wide cost reductions occur because there is no incentive for 
them to lower their prices.”).
230. Cf. Joshua & Jordan, supra note 26, at 662 (“Economists tend not to draw a 
distinction between ‘tacit’ and ‘express’ collusion, while for lawyers, used to a conduct-
based test, one of the most difficult problems in the whole field of antitrust law is finding
some ‘avoidable act’ on which liability could be affixed.”). 
 231. Piraino, supra note 4, at 24; see also Zellmer, supra note 3, at 842 (discussing
how courts appear to “search for circumstantial evidence that the parties did communicate 
before engaging in parallel behavior,” and ultimately concluding that the “plus factor 
approach” is not effective in determining whether tactic collusion is occurring in oligopolistic 
industries); cf. Lopatka & Page, supra note 44, at 677–78 (“Courts have required
evidence of certain ‘plus factors,’ defined tautologically as activity that ‘tend[s] to
exclude the possibility that the defendants merely were engaged in lawful conscious 
parallelism.’” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
 232. Appel, supra note 17, at 385–86 (footnote omitted); see also  HYLTON, supra
note 34, at 75 (“Increasingly, enforcement authorities face a decision whether to abandon 
the strictures of Section 1 conspiracy doctrine or to ignore some sophisticated research in
economics.”); Brodley, supra note 77, at 294 (“Cases under section [1] of the Sherman 
Act focused on whether an actual agreement could be proved, whereas economic theory
teaches that one of the characteristics of oligopoly markets is the fact that uniformity of
price and other terms of sale can occur without agreement.”). 
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the closer they come to maximizing the welfare of consumers”233 
because it is an “obvious fact that more efficient methods of doing 
business are as valuable to the public as they are to businessmen.”234 
One is left wondering to what extent the simple fact of redefining
“consumer welfare” leads to a focus on concepts such as agreement,
rather than on whether the practice actually has an effect on consumers.
More generally, if what is good for industry is good for consumers, then 
how can conscious parallelism be bad?235 
But the Chicago School rhetoric—as convenient as it might be to the 
business lobby—is too facile.236  It conveniently forgets that antitrust’s
overarching goal is to protect competition.237  Indeed, “[w]hat has
confused popular and some instructed opinion has been the focusing of 
attention upon the rights of producers, a defect which the conscious
acceptance of consumers’ sovereignty as an ideal instead of a vague 
conception of the maximisation of social utility or welfare might have 
removed.”238  In the context of conscious parallelism, the implication is
simple: “collusion among firms, if successful, benefits the participants at 
the expense of their customers or suppliers.  From a social perspective, 
 233. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
97 (The Free Press 1993) (1978). 
234. Id. at 4.  As Robert Skitol notes, “While Chicago School adherents trumpeted 
their support of ‘consumer welfare,’ they used that term in a counterintuitive manner to
mean overall economy-wide efficiency rather than the protection of consumers as a class 
distinct from producers or a producer’s shareholding owners.”  Robert A. Skitol, The
Shifting Sands of Antitrust Policy: Where It Has Been, Where It Is Now, Where It Will Be
in Its Third Century, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 249 (1999). 
235. Cf. Piraino, supra note 4, at 14 (“[T]he Chicago School . . . has also given
oligopolists free rein to engage in tacit price-fixing arrangements harmful to consumers.”).
236. For example, in an amicus brief filed in the Twombly litigation, the Chamber
of Commerce suggests that “[p]arallel competitive behavior by businesses is endemic in
an industrial economy and it is almost always desirable behavior that should be encouraged.” 
Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 24–25, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-
1126).  Note the convenient interjection of the word “competitive” without definition or
explanation.
237. See, e.g., Panel and Audience Discussion on Shared-Monopoly Theories, supra
note 104, at 262 (“There must be more concern about preserving competition for its own
sake; there cannot be competition without competitors.”) (statement of Max Blecher);
Raffaelli, supra note 43, at 917 (“[A]ntitrust law . . . aims to protect the game of competition 
in the public interest.”).
 238. W.H. Hutt, The Nature of Aggressive Selling, 2 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 298, 319
(1935). 
 629





   
     
 
 















    
     
 
            
  
    
  
  
the losses usually outweigh the benefits.”239  As such, “not surprisingly, 
policies which render tacit collusion more difficult are in the public 
interest.”240  Current doctrine, with its emphasis on having to prove
agreement among defendants, regrettably cuts against this policy goal.
IV. THE REMEDY BUGABOO
Once conscious parallelism is detected using econometric methods, 
the problem of fashinoning appropriate remedies inevitably enters the 
picture.  Then Judge, now Justice, Breyer sums up the concern well: 
Courts have noted that the Sherman Act prohibits agreements, and they have
almost uniformly held, at least in the pricing area, that such individual pricing
decisions (even when each firm rests its own decision upon its belief that
competitors will do the same) do not constitute an unlawful agreement under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.  That is not because such pricing is desirable (it 
is not), but because it is close to impossible to devise a judicially enforceable 
remedy for “interdependent” pricing.  How does one order a firm to set its prices 
without regard to the likely reactions of its competitors?241 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, Part IV argues that there 
is indeed a menu of remedies that can be drawn from to address the 
problem of conscious parallelism—from damages to injunctions to 
structural remedies to regulation.242 
 239. Porter, supra note 29, at 148; see also Doerr, supra note 181, at 104–05 (“The
end result is the collective loss in welfare for the largest and most important group in the 
commercial equation, the consumers.”); Jullien & Rey, supra note 143, at 995 (“There is 
then a real conflict between the preferences of the manufacturer and the preferences of 
consumers and society.”). 
240. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, Tacit Collusion, Free Entry and Welfare, 
33 J. INDUS. ECON. 277, 292–93 (1985). 
241. Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(third emphasis added) (citations omitted), superseded by statute, Trademark Law Revision
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935; see also  VISCUSI ET AL., supra note
49, at 131 (discussing how although the outcome of tactic collusion is just as harmful “as 
if the firms operated a cartel,” the remedies under antitrust laws “would probably need to 
differ” in light of the fact that “tacit understandings might require a structure dissolution
of the industry to be made ineffective”); Goldman, supra note 22, at 1080 (discussing
how it is problematic to formulate a remedy if interdependence is treated as an agreement 
under the Sherman Act). 
242. The antitrust laws bring with them many choices.  As Herbert Hovenkamp
observes: 
The full range of antitrust remedies is very broad.  Going roughly from most to 
least severe, they include: (1) criminal punishment for guilty managers;
(2) divestiture or other “structural” breakup; (3) broad mandatory orders such as
compulsory dealing; (4) treble damages; (5) fines; (6) narrowly tailored injunctions
in the form of “cease and desist” orders.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 132, at 64. 
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First, and by analogy to price-fixing cases, damages could be assessed
for the difference between the competitive and supracompetitive price.243 
But calculating damages in antitrust cases is notoriously difficult and
may not provide sufficient deterrence; as a consequence, focus shifts to 
other forms of remedies.  One article sums up the general sentiment well 
by belittling the injunction as “a singularly inept tool when used to 
prevent conscious imitation.”244  This pessimism, however, is misplaced 
and likely driven largely by the impracticable injunctions discussed in 
the literature.  It does not take much time or insight, for example, to 
realize that injunctions that force competitors to price at marginal cost,245 
or not mimic their competitors,246 are practically useless. 
More limited, less grandiose injunctions would be workable.  The key 
insight here is first to identify practices that facilitate conscious 
parallelism.247  Examples include “delivered pricing; freight equalization;
price books or other pricing formulas; standardization of products; 
standardization of credit or other terms; most favored nation agreements 
with customers or other forms of price protection; and exchanges or 
publication of price and transaction information.”248  Then, once the
243. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 22, at 1098. 
244. Conscious Parallelism—Fact or Fancy?, supra note 28, at 684. 
245. For example, in his classic article Turner suggests: 
The only injunction which would have any prospect of being understandable 
and, at the same time, establishing something like a competitive price would be 
one which said to each defendant: “Always increase your output to the point 
where marginal cost (the additional cost of producing the last unit of output)
equals the price that can be obtained; or, alternatively, always lower your price 
to the point where it equals marginal cost.”
  The difficulties with this exotic formulation are obvious. 
Turner, supra note 45, at 670. 
246. Turner also argues that: 
Superficially, the injunction would be somewhat more meaningful if it prohibited
each defendant from taking into account the probably price decisions of his
competitor in determining his own price or output. . . .  But such an injunction,
read literally, appears to demand such irrational behavior that full compliance 
would be virtually impossible. 
Id. at 669. 
247. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 99, at 951–52 (“In summary a facilitating practice 
is a practice that in one way or another makes it easier for firms to coordinate price and
output strategies, and thereby to acquire and maintain some degree of collective market
power.”).
 248. Lionel Kestenbaum, What Is “Price Signalling” and Does It Violate the Law?, 
49 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 911 (1980); see also Blechman, supra note 51, at 891 (listing the 
various practices that make “price uniformity” possible). 
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practices have been identified, narrow injunctions can be imposed
against them249—most notably, to prohibit price signaling done either
directly among competitors,250 or indirectly via trade associations.251 
Government agencies could take the lead,252 not to mention injunctions
that might emerge as relief to private lawsuits.  Regardless of who might 
bring suit, the point is simple: “the practical objection to an attack on
conscious parallelism—that illegal practices should be clearly
describable—can be overcome if unreasonable facilitating practices are
forbidden.”253 
Beyond injunctions, another approach is structural relief.  To the 
extent that conscious parallelism is a product of oligopolistic market 
structure,254 the remedy might be to restructure the market into a less
concentrated one.  Once again, this appears to be an unpopular option,255 
largely due to the success of Chicago School’s law and economics 
approach, which espouses a minimalist vision for antitrust.256  Structural
remedies, however, do not deserve the popular scorn they have received.
At the most fundamental level, those who disparage structural remedies 
conveniently forget that “[a]ntitrust law recognizes the inherent 
advantages of markets with many buyers and sellers.  This basic premise 
undergirds virtually all economic discussions of the efficiency of 
competitive markets.”257  Consider first that a merger policy more solicitous
of consumer, rather than producer, interests would itself be a form of
structural remedy that, ex ante, could prevent the further concentration 
of industries.258 
249. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 99, at 952; Vita, supra note 105, at 993; Sargent, 
supra note 78, at 2103.  Of course, some commentators have proposed more nuanced
injunctions not directly related to facilitating practices. See, e.g., Sagi, supra note 117, at 
295 (“According to this suggested price freeze, whenever a firm in an oligopoly market 
makes a substantial price cut, the other firms in that market will be prohibited from 
lowering their prices for a defined period of time.”). 
250. See, e.g., Aldor, supra note 100, at 96. 
251. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 99, at 931; Simonetti, supra note 34, at 1245. 
252. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 96, at 182–83; Bunda, supra note 89, at 208. 
 253. Schaefer, supra note 20, at 540. 
254. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 38, at 1565. 
255. See, e.g., Vita, supra note 105, at 992. 
256. See, e.g., Lopatka, supra note 48, at 904 (“In sum, wholesale restructuring of
concentrated markets is no longer considered a serious policy option.  On this score at 
least, Posner, other Chicagoans, and some commentators before them have prevailed.”). 
257. Morriss & Stewart, supra note 134, at 1032–33. 
258. See, e.g., Doerr, supra note 181, at 117; Lopatka, supra note 48, at 902.  Even 
Richard Posner admits that because “mergers historically have been an important source
of concentration, a strong antimerger policy should do much to prevent new oligopolies
from emerging and loosely oligopolistic industries from becoming tightly oligopolistic.” 
Posner, supra note 38, at 1566. 
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Yet, a more robust merger policy is at best a partial remedy—given 
decades of lax antitrust enforcement, many industries are already
oligopolistic.  Fortunately, the same structural logic could be applied ex 
post to help consumers by deconcentrating industries,259 or perhaps by
simply interjecting a government-supported competitor to alter the 
structure of an otherwise comfortably oligopolistic industry.260  This is
admittedly a muscular approach in today’s less ambitious antitrust world,261 
but one cannot help but wonder whether the distaste for structural relief 
is driven more by the discomfort of oligopolists than by a concern for
consumer welfare.  Perhaps most amusingly, in the neglected portion of 
his seminal article, Turner himself strongly advocated structural relief,
going so far as to observe that “[i]f effective and workable relief requires 
a radical structural reformation of the industry, this indicates that it was 
the structural situation, not the behavior of the industry members, which
was fundamentally responsible for the unsatisfactory results.”262  As one
commentator notes, with some understatement: 
One aspect of Turner’s approach has not been favorably received.  Courts
have not used section 2 to impose structural remedies on persistent oligopolies. 
For that matter, courts have not embraced the wellspring of Turner’s position,
his conviction that enduring monopolies, simply because no good can come of
long-held monopoly power, should be broken up.263 
This observation raises a simple question: why have scholars embraced
one part of Turner’s argument but not the other?  This inquiry is 
especially troubling given the attractiveness of structural remedies
259. See, e.g., Blechman, supra note 51, at 888 (“Some scholars and legislators have 
concluded that the essential problem is structural, and they have accordingly proposed
new statutes which would attack the alleged anticompetitive structure of oligopolistic
industries.”). 
260. See, e.g., Helmuth Cremer et al., The Public Firm as an Instrument for 
Regulating an Oligopolistic Market, 41 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 283, 300 (1989); Gal, 
supra note 40, at 4; cf. Stanbury & Reschenthaler, supra note 20, at 697 (“Government 
procurement policies can be used to ‘reward’ firms who deviate from parallel pricing or
price leadership in oligopolies.”).
261. See, e.g., VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 49, at 134. 
 262. Turner, supra note 45, at 671. 
 263. Lopatka, supra note 48, at 903; see also Bunda, supra note 89, at 191 (“Turner 
proposed legislation permitting courts to deconcentrate oligopolistic markets to solve the 
problem, but this proposal was never seriously enacted in the legislature or the courts.” 
(footnote omitted)).
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identified clearly not only by Turner but by future generations of 
observers.264 
Finally, yet another option within the panoply of remedies to 
conscious parallelism is the regulation of oligopolistic industries.265 
Much like structural remedies, regulation has been out of vogue in the 
literature.266  This is unfortunate given that one might conceptualize 
oligopoly as closer to monopoly and then invoke regulatory tools that 
are used in monopolistic industries.  More technically, the conscious 
parallelism present in many oligopolistic industries might be the 
symptom of what game theorists would call an “empty core”: certain
markets prone to high fixed costs, as oligopolistic markets often are, tend
not to converge to a stable competitive equilibrium;267 as a consequence, and
perhaps counterintuitively, faced with an empty core, “competition may
require some cooperation in order to obtain efficiency.”268  Conscious
parallelism, then, is an example of such “cooperation.”269  As one
distinguished core theorist himself points out:
[The observations of core theory] suggest that explicit cartelization, tacit collusion, 
and horizontal merger can be viewed, in many instances, as the noncompetitive 
arrangements that the firms in an industry must necessarily adopt.  Whether the 
resulting arrangements are in any sense optimal is another matter, and in some 
264. See, e.g., Conant, supra note 84, at 822 (“The only effective and lasting 
remedy to a monopoly or collusive oligopoly is to alter the basic market structure by
dissolution of the one or few firms into many firms.”); Simonetti, supra note 34, at 1245 
(“Dispersal of economic power through divestiture and dissolution of the defendants is
perhaps the most effective means to restore competition in the market, and it is ordered
regularly when the creation of a combination is itself the violation.” (footnote omitted)).
265. See, e.g., Aldor, supra note 100, at 97 (“Another alternative that should not be 
overlooked is market regulation.”). 
266. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 52, at 401. 
267. A game or market is said to have a “core” if goods can be traded among 
participants such that the “final allocations are in the hands of those who value most
what they get.”  Lester G. Telser, Cooperation, Competition, and Efficiency, 28 J.L. &
ECON. 271, 274 (1985).  Although this might be valid when it is possible to disaggregate 
supply to meet changing demand, it becomes questionable in industries characterized by
high fixed costs.  As one scholar points out, “when costs are characterized by indivisibilities
(for example, avoidable costs) and demand is finely divisible, the core may be ‘empty.’
In other words, a competitive equilibrium frequently fails to exist, and, as a consequence,
competitive interactions between firms cannot generate an efficient allocation of 
resources.”  Stephen Craig Pirrong, An Application of Core Theory to the Analysis of 
Ocean Shipping Markets, 35 J.L. & ECON. 89, 89 (1992). 
 268. Telser, supra note 267, at 272. 
269. Cf. William Sjostrom, Collusion in Ocean Shipping: A Test of Monopoly and
Empty Core Models, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1160, 1177 (1989) (“Agreements among firms to
fix prices and allocate output may exist to solve the problem of an empty core.”).
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cases it may turn out to be correct to substitute government regulation or 
ownership for self-regulation.270 
Notwithstanding the powerful analogy to monopoly and congruence 
with core theory, regulation inevitably faces two related objections:
courts are not regulators,271 and antitrust is not regulation.272  Yet nothing 
presupposes courts would do the regulating: regulation could be implemented
by an administrative agency.  In addition, scholars have wisely begun to 
observe that “[a]ntitrust is nothing if not economic regulation”273 and 
that the “attempt to draw a sharp demarcation between antitrust and
regulatory objectives is a mistake.”274  As such, contemplating the
regulation of industries prone to conscious parallelism not only accords 
with core theory but has the additional advantage of offering a holistic 
approach to antitrust and regulation in an effort to protect consumer 
welfare.275 
In the end, the remedies problem will remain an insurmountable one if 
public policy remains wedded to the strawmen proposed in the
 270. George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New
Look at the Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J.L. & ECON. 201, 203–04 (1982) (emphasis added).
271. See, e.g., WHINSTON, supra note 180, at 53 (“It is also sometimes argued that 
to apply the Sherman Act to tacit collusion would involve the courts in an ongoing 
process akin to price regulation of industries.”). 
272. See Carstensen, supra note 85, at 506 (“Indeed, the direct control over performance 
distinguishes traditional utility regulation from the antitrust model of indirect, performance 
control.”). 
 273. George Bittlingmayer, The Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal 
Research Can Contribute, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 739, 744 (1989). 
274. Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing To Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 
1177, 1184 (2002); see also Thomas Gale Moore, Introduction, Antitrust and Economic 
Efficiency: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution, 28 J.L. & ECON. 245, 245 
(1985) (“Only recently have economists begun to recognize that the antitrust laws are 
regulatory statutes.”).
275. William Baumol and Gregory Sidak summarize the benefits of harmonizing 
antitrust and regulation:
This harmony between regulation and antitrust has three important implications.  
First, the same basic tools of microeconomic analysis can be employed in one 
as in the other. . . .  Second, changes in technology or other circumstances that 
permit natural monopoly to give way to competition impart continuity to the 
relationship between economic regulation and antitrust.  Third, many of the 
thorniest problems in antitrust law . . . are fundamentally regulatory in nature, 
involving issues such as entry or the pricing of intermediate goods sold to 
competitors.  Thus, the economic scholarship on regulation can in many instances 
enrich antitrust jurisprudence. 
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY
27 (1994). 
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literature—telling an oligopolist to price at marginal cost or not mimic 
another oligopolist are typical examples of comically vague injunctions. 
Careful analysis, however, reveals a wide menu of options available to 
policymakers—from damages, to carefully crafted injunctions, to stricter
merger review and other structural relief, to regulation—if they simply 
move beyond the “shortsightedness of taking a mechanistic approach to 
questions of remedy.”276  Possibilities exist if we are willing to engage
them. 
V. CONCLUSION
Conscious parallelism is, to be sure, a difficult problem in antitrust 
theory.277  Much of the problem lies with the fact that the phenomenon 
rears its head in oligopolistic industries that are far less well understood 
than either monopolistic or atomistically competitive markets.278  As  
such, “[c]ourts and commentators have long struggled with the proper 
treatment of parallel conduct by competitors in oligopoly markets.”279 
Yet it does no good, except to the oligopolists, to resign oneself to the 
notion that mainstream thinking in cartel theory is not imaginative 
enough to address the phenomenon, so we just let it be. 
This Article has outlined one path—there is an ample statutory basis 
to pursue conscious parallelism claims, careful economic analysis can
differentiate between competitive and collusive environments, and a 
menu of remedies exists in the law to address instances of conscious
parallelism. Underlying this approach is the belief that we need to return
to first principles: at its core, the “analysis should focus on whether the 
practice raised price or restricted output, not on its label.”280 
 276. Nye, supra note 23, at 230; cf. id. at 228 (“[I]f we really need structural 
remedies in conduct cases, let’s use them.  I am not hung up on the theoretical 
desirability of preserving some grand symmetry which assigns ‘conduct’ remedies to the 
conduct side of the cathedral and puts ‘structural’ relief across the aisle.”). 
277. See, e.g., Lopatka, supra note 48, at 860. 
278. See, e.g., Bunda, supra note 89, at 205; Sagi, supra note 117, at 271. 
 279. Goldman, supra note 22, at 1057; see also Piraino, supra note 4, at 11 (“Since 
the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, a debate has raged over whether the antitrust
laws can be construed to preclude tacit collusion among oligopolists.”); Alan M. 
Anderson, Note, Conscious Parallelism in the Use of Delivered Pricing Systems: A 
Modified Per Se Standard of Review Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 1194, 1194 (1981) (“The legality of conscious parallelism long has
been a debated issue in antitrust law.” (footnote omitted)).
280. Carlton et al., supra note 188, at 427; see also Nye, supra note 23, at 221 
(“[O]ne can asseverate that it does not matter whether there has been a conspiracy or not. 
So long as the undesirable end result of monopoly profits was attained, by conscious 
parallelism or what have you, antitrust should intervene.”); cf. Panel and Audience 
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Some will no doubt disagree with this argument, but we should 
recognize that the discourse surrounding conscious parallelism is stale. 
Current doctrine remains enamored with a purposefully selective reading 
of Donald Turner’s 1962 classic article.  We remain curiously obsessed
over the terms like “agreement” or “conspiracy,”281 even though it is
plain that “the harm caused by an increase in price above the competitive 
level is the same whether or not it results from overt agreement.”282  It is
deeply troubling that after all these decades the oligopoly problem seems
intractable,283 with commentators describing it as one that “defies 
solving”284 or “the most troubling in the antitrust field.”285  The regrettable 
upshot is that “United States antitrust law is presently ineffective in its 
efforts to detect oligopolistic tacit collusion.”286  Perhaps this lacuna
exists because scholars have not paid sufficient attention to the issue of
conscious parallelism; put bluntly, “the literature has persistently
ignored that the issue of tacit collusion raises deep challenges for our 
understanding of coordinated conduct that are of central concern for 
competition policy.”287  Commentary remains wedded to antiquated ideas—
perhaps more than anything, “[w]hat is striking to any contemporary 
student of antitrust about this history of the oligopoly problem is that so 
little has changed in the last 35 [now nearly 50] years.”288 
The great irony is that the problem of conscious parallelism has been
recognized since Adam Smith’s time289 and was actually dealt with 
Discussion on Shared-Monopoly Theories, supra note 104, at 249 (“The primary role of 
the antitrust laws is to see that the economic system works, in the sense that commerce is
directed by individual decisions rather than group decisions, by individual action rather
than conspiracies.”) (statement of John Hanson). 
281. See, e.g., Werden, supra note 119, at 777–78. 
 282. Schaefer, supra note 20, at 537; see also Brodley, supra note 77, at 288 (“Even 
the vocabulary of antitrust failed.  Prices were not fixed but ‘administered.’  Conditions 
of sale were not dictated by a monopoly combine, but set by a ‘price leader.’  Yet the 
results of oligopoly power could be as destructive of a competitive market as those
caused by the exercise of monopoly power or by other economic behavior susceptible to 
antitrust discipline.”).
283. See, e.g., Raffaelli, supra note 43, at 915. 
 284. Lopatka, supra note 48, at 908. 
285. William F. Baxter, Posner’s Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, 8 BELL
J. ECON. 609, 613 (1977) (book review); see also Weissman, supra note 33, at 437
(“Uncertainty pervades the application of the antitrust laws to oligopoly.”). 
 286. Zellmer, supra note 3, at 844. 
 287. Kühn, supra note 218, at 208. 
 288. Lopatka, supra note 48, at 846. 
289. As Smith himself famously noted: 
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using a more ambitious antitrust policy prior to Theatre Enterprises.290 
In the ensuing decades, however, perhaps largely due to the ascendancy 
of the Chicago School and a concomitant desire to push neoclassical
price theory, we have lost our way. As one distinguished economist 
observes, “Typically, the neoclassicists have drawn a distinction between 
natural monopoly and competitive industry structures, which minimizes 
the need to explore a role for public control in treating the problems
posed by oligopoly, imperfect competition, and corporate strategies to 
maintain market dominance.”291 
Unfortunately for the neoclassicists, “[b]etween the perfect competition 
and monopoly of theory lie the actual cases”292 in which simplistic price
theory simply will not do.293 Today’s reality amply reveals that “[m]any 
sectors of the American economy are oligopolistic”294—as such, “[t]he 
high levels of concentration in many U.S. markets today guarantee that
tacit collusion will be a continuing problem.”295  As mergers proceed apace
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance 
to raise prices.  It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law 
which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. 
But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes 
assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; must
less to render them necessary.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
128 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1937) (1776). 
290. See, e.g., Blechman, supra note 51, at 888. 
291. Harry M. Trebing, Public Control of Enterprise: Neoclassical Assault and
Neoinstitutional Reform, 18 J. ECON. ISSUES 353, 356 (1984). 
 292. Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 44 (1929). 
293. See, e.g., Rothschild, supra note 35, at 300 (“But at the same time it became 
increasingly clear that with modern trends towards large-scale enterprise, product differentiation, 
advertising and trade agreements, the competitive price analysis lost much of its force.”).
 294. Levins, supra note 36, at 181.  For example, 
The public accounting industry includes only four national firms; four automobile
companies produce approximately 75% of the cars in the United States; seven 
national carriers control most domestic airline traffic; Visa and MasterCard together 
account for most of the transactions in the credit card market; four tobacco
companies manufacture 97% of the cigarettes sold in the United States; and five
pharmaceutical companies produce most of the nation’s prescription drugs. 
Piraino, supra note 4, at 11 (footnotes omitted). 
 295. Piraino, supra note 4, at 11; see also Panel and Audience Discussion on 
Shared-Monopoly Theories, supra note 104, at 260 (“It is time to face reality and say
that today many of the basic industries in this country simply are not competitive in the 
price sense.”) (statement of Max Blecher); Rothschild, supra note 35, at 319 (“[M]odern 
conditions have largely destroyed the applicability of Marshall’s price analysis to the 
world of to-day.”). 
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and more and more industries consolidate into oligopolies or duopolies,
the problem is only bound to get worse.296  As one writer observes
[I]t is hard to contest the fact that antitrust law, which is institutionally aimed at
safeguarding the game of competition, seems to refuse to act against oligopolistic
markets.  At the same time, those are the very markets that are becoming 
increasingly important and widespread. This is not an acceptable result.297 
We can, and should, do better.298 
296. As the postmodern philosopher Jean Baudrillard notes: 
It might appear that the historical movement of capital carries it from one 
open competition towards oligopoly, then towards monopoly—that the democratic 
movement goes from multiple parties toward bipartism, then toward the single
party.  Nothing of the sort: oligopoly, or the current duopoly results from a
tactical doubling of monopoly.  In all domains duopoly is the final stage of
monopoly.  It is not the public will (state intervention, anti-trust laws, etc.) which
breaks up the monopoly of the market—it is the fact that any unitary system, if 
it wishes to survive, must acquire a binary regulation. 
JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATIONS 133–34 (Paul Foss et al. trans., 1983). 
 297. Raffaelli, supra note 43, at 933. 
298. Cf. Bunda, supra note 89, at 209 (“Solving the oligopoly problem is essential 
to an effective, coherent, and rational antitrust policy.”). 
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